Utah Law Review
Volume 2016 | Number 2

Article 4

2016

Mediation as Regulation: Expanding State
Governance over Private Disputes
Lydia Nussbaum

Follow this and additional works at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
Recommended Citation
Nussbaum, Lydia (2016) "Mediation as Regulation: Expanding State Governance over Private Disputes," Utah Law Review: Vol. 2016 :
No. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: http://dc.law.utah.edu/ulr/vol2016/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Utah Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Law Review by an
authorized editor of Utah Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact valeri.craigle@law.utah.edu.

MEDIATION AS REGULATION: EXPANDING STATE GOVERNANCE
OVER PRIVATE DISPUTES
Lydia Nussbaum*
Abstract
Across the United States, state legislatures are issuing new mediation
mandates that govern how private parties resolve their disputes.
Legislatures embed these mediation mandates into specific statutory
regimes ranging from foreclosure to health care to insurance coverage.
Rather than leave decisions about ADR design to other state institutions,
like courts or administrative agencies, legislatures increasingly retain
that authority and formalize the mediation process with legal
requirements that regulate parties’ behavior and influence mediation
outcomes. This Article explains how legislatures wield mediation as a
regulatory tool in this latest phase of mediation’s institutionalization. It
argues that statutory mediation mandates should be viewed as a form of
decentralized governance, a paradigm that reconfigures the relationship
between public and private spheres of power. Viewing these mandates as
decentralized governance reveals what can be helpful, and also
problematic, about formalizing mediation and underscores why
legislatures must exercise care when designing procedural architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mediation is a familiar fixture in many American legal institutions but its role
is changing. When disputants bring their grievances to courts and administrative
agencies, they are encouraged—often required—to participate in mediation, a
private and confidential meeting where the disputing parties work together, with a
neutral third party, to try to resolve their differences.1 In recent years, however,
legislation requiring mediation, particularly at the state level, has expanded in
scope and in complexity. State legislatures obligate private parties to mediate
certain types of disputes, sometimes formalizing the process in statute and
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1
See SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE app. A (2013–
2014 ed. 2013) (cataloguing statutes from all U.S. jurisdictions that contain “mediation”
and “conciliation”).
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sometimes requiring mediation before parties may turn to state institutions for
assistance. As a result, mediation has become a new vehicle for state intervention
that redraws old boundaries between public and private dispute resolution.
Statutory mediation mandates fall into two categories. In one, legislators
embed mediation requirements into statutory regimes, forcing parties to mediate
when certain substantive legal rights are at stake. For example, in some states,
patients who believe they are victims of medical malpractice,2 parties that cannot
agree on terms modifying a beer-distribution contract,3 and nursing mothers
seeking to enforce their rights under a state Workplace Accommodations Act4 all
must mediate before they can initiate formal claims. In the second category,
legislatures not only require mediation, but also control how parties mediate. A
Maine statute requires lenders and homeowners to attend foreclosure mediation
and, during the mediation session, complete worksheets to determine the
homeowner’s eligibility for a loan modification.5 California’s statute mandating
mediation of insurance coverage disputes prohibits the insurers’ legal counsel from
attending mediation if the insured party lacks legal representation.6 Both categories
of mediation statutes constitute legislative regulation of parties’ negotiation
behavior and an effort to influence dispute resolution outcomes.7
State statutes that compel mediation or particularize the mediation process
signal a new phase in mediation’s institutionalization. Ordinarily, federal and state
legislatures give courts and administrative agencies discretion in designing
mediation programs and establishing guidelines for parties and mediators. While
others have written about court-connected mediation programs requiring litigants
to mediate,8 little attention has been paid to legislatures’ role in mandating
mediation for private disputes and the regulatory nature of those mandates.9

2

S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (Supp. 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100
(West 2007).
3
MD. CODE ANN. art. 2B, § 21-103 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Act 2008).
4
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-104(5) (2012).
5
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A (2014).
6
CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.80 (West 2013).
7
The relationship between state authority and informal justice has been explored
elsewhere. See 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 267–75
(Richard L. Abel ed., 1982). Abel and the contributors to his edited volumes discuss, often
with skepticism, the extent to which informal dispute resolution can really exist free of
state control. Whereas Abel explores the delegalization of formal dispute resolution
processes, the focus of this Article is on a different phenomenon: state efforts to formalize
an informal procedure like mediation. Furthermore, the Article concentrates on the
statutory language itself and does not conduct empirical analysis of whether there are gaps
between the law on the books and parties’ behavior on the ground.
8
See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, The Place of Court-Connected Mediation in a
Democratic Justice System, 5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 117, 138–39 (2004); Douglas
A. Van Epps, The Impact of Mediation on State Courts, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL.
627, 627–34 (2002); Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 246–49 (2006); Peter N. Thompson, Good Faith Mediation in
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Why is a process like mediation, classically characterized by privacy,
informality, a lack of prefabricated structure, and participant-driven resolution,
being deployed in such a structured, rule-based way? While no clear legislative
intent emerges from states deploying mediation as a regulatory tool, one possible
explanation for this new frontier in state regulation of dispute resolution comes
from governance theory.
Governance theory explores the relationship between governments and the
governed.10 There are many different models for characterizing this relationship;
for example, a government can be interventionist in its regulatory approach or it
can be laissez-faire. But a third model of regulatory governance, which some have
called “decentralized,” “reflexive,” “responsive,” “procedural,” or “libertarian
paternalism,”11 is particularly relevant to understanding legislative mediation
mandates. The animating theory behind decentralized governance is that states can
advance social welfare by restoring some autonomy and decision-making power to
regulated entities. States effectuate decentralized governance, not by erasing
regulation altogether (which would be de-regulation), but by constructing new
processes in which regulated actors must participate.
This Article argues that statutory mediation mandates should be characterized
as decentralized governance because it best describes the changing relationship
between the state and private actors when it comes to dispute resolution. Statutory
mediation mandates relocate authority over dispute resolution from the state to
private parties, creating opportunities for disputants to negotiate directly and
resolve their conflicts without state adjudication yet within procedural parameters
laid down by the state. Formalizing private parties’ dispute processing through the
procedural architecture of decentralized governance can promote (more) balanced
negotiations between parties than might otherwise occur. However, it also has the
potential to burden parties with additional complexity and, where disputants have
mismatched negotiation power, place the vulnerable party at a disadvantage.
Legislatures, therefore, must be purposeful when issuing mediation mandates in
substantive law and formalizing elements of the mediation process. By recognizing
the existence of these new state intrusions into the traditionally private sphere of

the Federal Courts, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 363, 378–85 (2011). For a discussion
of how mediation has been integrated at the federal level, see Jeffrey M. Senger, Turning
the Ship of State, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 79, 79–86 (2000).
9
With the exception of a 1986 symposium, Proposed Legislation on Critical Issues in
Mediation, which focused on regulation of mediators and the mediation process (e.g.,
confidentiality, enforceability of mediated agreements, mediator privilege and immunity)
and a handful of subject-specific articles on environmental dispute resolution or special
education dispute resolution, the author found no articles that examined the integration of
mediation into state legislative statutory regimes. Symposium, Proposed Legislation on
Critical Issues in Mediation, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 121, 121–27 (1986).
10
See infra Part V.
11
See infra Part V.C.
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mediation, legislatures can take care to enhance, rather than erode, fairness and
justice.
The Article is organized in six parts. Part II begins by explaining classical
mediation’s unique characteristics and how it differs from other dispute resolution
processes like public adjudication and private arbitration. Part III then discusses
why mediation became “institutionalized” in the American legal system as a tool
for judicial reform. Part IV explores the latest phase in mediation’s
institutionalization: substantive statutes with embedded mediation requirements,
some of which also regulate parties’ behavior and influence mediation outcomes
by formalizing different dimensions of the mediation process. Part V argues that
this phenomenon should be understood as decentralized governance. Part VI
argues that while these statutory mediation mandates may provide private parties
greater authority over dispute resolution outcomes, formalizing mediation can be
problematic. It therefore concludes with recommendations to policymakers about
how to formalize mediation so that it can be beneficial and not harmful to parties.
II. MEDIATION, CLASSICALLY SPEAKING
Before embarking on a discussion of mediation’s formalization, this Article
must first clarify: what is mediation? This Part sets out mediation’s core principles
and identifies the classic characteristics that distinguish it from other dispute
resolution processes.
Mediation brings disputing parties together with a third party who helps them
identify issues of concern, overcome communication barriers, and explore possible
options for resolving the dispute.12 The mediation process can look very different
depending on its context. Like the finches Charles Darwin observed inhabiting the
Galapagos Islands,13 the mediation process adapts to its unique environment,14 the

12

4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 6 (2007) (citing GRENIG & DAVIES,
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2:16). The drafters of the Uniform Mediation Act,
with input from mediation practitioners and scholars around the country, defined mediation
as “a process in which a mediator facilitates communication and negotiation between
parties to assist them in reaching a voluntary agreement regarding their dispute.” NAT’L
CONF. OF COMM’RS OF UNIF. ST. LAWS, UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 2(1) (2003),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mediation/uma_final_03.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DYX8-8LCV].
13
Charles Darwin recorded the tremendous variety of finch species living on the
Galapagos Islands, each finch having developed unique characteristics that allowed it to
thrive in its particular island environment. Despite their differences, all of the birds still
belonged to same family of birds, Thraupidae or tanagers (although this placement in the
tanager family is a matter of debate). See Kevin J. Burns et al., Phylogenetics and
Diversification of Tanagers (Passeriformes: Thraupidae), the Largest Radiation of
Neotropical Songbirds, 75 MOLECULAR PHYLOGENETICS & EVOLUTION 41, 58 (2014).
14
JAMES J. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 2006)
(discussing mediation of different kinds of legal and nonlegal disputes); see also David
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nature of the dispute,15 the parties,16 whether the parties have legal representation,17
and the mediator.18 Thus, the term “mediation” can denote a range of different
processes, each operating according to different philosophies about the objectives
of the process itself and the mediator’s role in furthering those objectives.19 For
example, mediators debate how a mediator helps disputants resolve conflicts in a
neutral way20 and whether a mediator should utilize techniques considered
“facilitative,”21 “transformative,”22 “evaluative,”23 or a combination of these
different approaches.24

Luban, The Quality of Justice, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 381, 382–83 (1988) (stating that
generalizations about ADR prove “loose and imperfect” because there are so many
varieties).
15
Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple
Model Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 707–14 (1997) (categorizing mediators’
approaches as “norm-generating,” “norm-educating,” or “norm-advocating”); see also
Lawrence Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L.
REV. 1, 40–44 (1981) (noting that in disputes over environmental quality or natural
resources, mediators bear special responsibility to ensure that settlements reached are in the
public’s interest).
16
Nancy Ver Steegh, Yes, No, and Maybe: Informed Decision Making about Divorce
Mediation in the Presence of Domestic Violence, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 145,
170–73 (2002) (stating that decisions to mediate are highly individualized and depend on
the particular interests and dynamics of the parties); see also Dean B. Thomson, A
Disconnect of Supply and Demand: Survey of Forum Members’ Mediation Preferences, 21
CONSTRUCTION LAW. 17, 20–21 (2001) (pointing out that a survey of the construction
industry shows that parties prefer a particular style of mediation).
17
Jean R. Sternlight, Lawyerless Dispute Resolution: Rethinking a Paradigm, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 381, 383 (2010).
18
James Alfini, Trashing, Bashing and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of “Good
Mediation”?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66–73 (1991) (highlighting interviews with
different court-connected mediators that demonstrate that their professional backgrounds
influence their mediation approach; for example, those who are retired judges are most
likely to “bash” out an agreement between the parties).
19
Jay Folberg notes that “[f]orms of conflict resolution in which a third party helps
disputants to resolve their conflicts and reach a decision of their own has probably been
practiced since there were three people on earth.” Jay Folberg, A Mediation Overview:
History and Dimensions of Practice, 1983 MEDIATION Q. 3, at 3–4 (1983).
20
Neutrality in the mediation context is generally taken to mean that the mediator has
no conflicts of interest or bias toward any party. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 9, cmts, supra
note 12. The mediation community has not reached consensus, however, about how the
mediator actually assists parties in a neutral way and whether mediators can still be neutral
while having an agenda of their own, such as the objective to obtain settlement. See, e.g.,
Joseph B. Stulberg, The Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind,
6 VT. L. REV. 85, 94–97 (1981) (noting that among many other qualities, a mediator must
be neutral with regard to outcome because that is how she develops a bond of trust with the
parties and ensures that parties’ substantive interests are not jeopardized).
21
Facilitative mediators often see their role as asking questions of the parties,
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These different species of mediation, however, all share common traits that
make mediation distinct from other dispute resolution processes: 1) mediation
employs a horizontal structure; 2) all outcomes require consensus; and 3)
discussions are confidential.
First, mediation occurs horizontally, between parties, rather than handed
down vertically from a third-party decision maker.25 As Lon Fuller wrote,
mediation’s central quality is
its capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing
rules on them, but by helping them to achieve a new and shared
perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect their
attitudes and dispositions toward one another.26

exploring interests underlying the conflict, and facilitating discussion about how the
conflict can be resolved. See, e.g., Joseph B. Stulberg, Facilitative Versus Evaluative
Mediator Orientations: Piercing the “Grid” Lock, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 985, 991–92
(1997); Kimberlee K. Kovach & Lela P. Love, Mapping Mediation: The Risks of Riskin’s
Grid, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV 71, 106, 108 (1998).
22
Transformative mediators focus on improving the quality of communication
between the parties in dispute and less on how to arrive at settlement. See, e.g., Robert A.
Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and Recognition?: The
Mediator’s Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV. 253, 263–64 (1989).
23
Evaluative mediators often rely heavily on separate caucus meetings with the
individual parties in order to help the parties analyze the strengths and weaknesses of their
legal positions and predict outcomes of court or other processes. See, e.g., Leonard L.
Riskin, Understanding Mediators’ Orientations, Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the
Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 27–28 (1996); James H. Stark, The Ethics of
Mediation Evaluation: Some Troublesome Questions and Tentative Proposals, from an
Evaluative Lawyer Mediator, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 769, 796 (2000).
24
Others have noted that different approaches to the mediator’s role are not mutually
exclusive and can be combined in sophisticated ways. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin,
Decisionmaking in Mediation: The New Old Grid and the New New Grid System, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 29–49 (2003); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalism and False
Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing a Flexible Concept of the Mediator’s Role, 24
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 949, 951–54 (1997); Nancy A. Welsh, You’ve Got Your Mother’s
Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn from the Her/History of Divorce and Child
Custody Mediation, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 427, 432–41 (2009). However, a number
of processes may be labeled mediation when they are in fact more like arbitration or some
other form of dispute resolution. See, e.g., Julie Heintz, Mediating Instead of “Mediating,”
75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 333, 334–35 (1998); Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 946–48 (1997).
25
Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes from It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV.
175, 177–178, 180 (1994) (“Vertical” models of justice rely upon hierarchies and power in
which a “decision is dictated from on high by the judge” while “horizontal” models of
justice are based on “equality and the full participation of disputants in a final decision.”).
26
Lon L. Fuller, Mediation—Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325
(1971). The way in which mediators actualize this “reorientation” can vary widely. See
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A mediator, rather than creating rules by which disputing parties will be bound,
“induce[s] the mutual trust and understanding that will enable the parties to work
out their own rules. The creation of rules is a process that cannot itself be rulebound . . . .”27
Second, and relatedly, parties in mediation make their own autonomous
decisions about whether and how to resolve their dispute. Both parties must
mutually agree to any terms of agreement, making mediation a “consensual”
dispute resolution process.28 Like direct party negotiations, classical mediation
requires consensus for resolution—scholars and practitioners often refer to
mediation as “problem-solving,” rather than oppositional, because at the end of the
day the parties need each other to agree to resolution.29
And third, mediation discussions are confidential.30 Unlike formal hearings,
the only written record of a classical mediation session consists of a signed
confidentiality agreement and, if the parties decide to resolve their dispute and
formalize the resolution in writing, a written agreement. Although practices do
vary, in the classical vision of mediation, the mediator does not make
recommendations to entities outside the mediation or report on mediation

supra notes 21–24. For a creative analysis identifying the origins of diverse mediation
models in legal movements of the twentieth century, see Michal Alberstein, The
Jurisprudence of Mediation: Between Formalism, Feminism and Identity Conversations,
11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 4–18 (2009).
27
Fuller, supra note 26, at 326.
28
A “consensual process” is one in which disputants retain the ability to consent to
ultimate resolution (e.g., fact finding, negotiation, mediation, conciliation) whereas an
“adjudicatory process” is one in which disputants surrender the power to decide the end
result to a third-party decision maker (e.g., administrative hearings, arbitration, judicial
decision making). John S. Murray, Guideposts for an Institutional Framework of
Consensual Dispute Processing, 1984 J. DISP. RESOL. 45, 48–49 (1984). However,
processes that are consensus-based in theory may not operate that way in practice. Nancy
A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do with
It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 846–51 (2001).
29
See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation:
The Structure of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984) (contrasting an
adversarial-individualistic-competitive approach to negotiation with an interest-based,
problem-solving approach).
30
COLE ET AL., supra note 1, at app. A. The Uniform Mediation Act attempted to
inject some uniformity in state laws governing mediation privileges and admissibility of
mediation. UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §§ 4, 5, 6, 8–12, supra note 12. Parties also contract for
confidentiality when they sign agreements to mediate, although these contractual
confidentiality clauses vary in scope and are vulnerable to the same legal challenges as
other private contracts.
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discussions in any other forum.31 The hope is that parties will participate candidly
and without fear of retribution as a result of what is said in mediation.32 Because of
confidentiality, it is presumed that parties will be more likely to exchange
information and make disclosures, especially information that goes against their
self-interest.33
These core principles of mediation make it distinct from other forms of
dispute resolution. Compared with adversarial processes like binding arbitration or
adjudication, in mediation parties do not face a win-lose contest34 and the mediator
has no authority to render a decision or make binding findings of fact.35 Mediation
discussions often unfold in an informal, unstructured way, without procedural rules
about who can speak, what they say, or when and how they say it.36 Unlike

31

Some state laws carve out some public-policy exceptions to confidentiality, for
example, in cases of child abuse. Art Hinshaw, Mediators as Mandatory Reporters of Child
Abuse: Preserving Mediation’s Core Values, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 273 (2006).
32
See, e.g., Maryland’s Mediation Confidentiality Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD.
PROC. § 3-1801 (West 2012). For a discussion of the policy reasons behind confidentiality
of mediation communications and mediator privilege, see UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, prefatory
n., supra note 12.
33
Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish
Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 81–82 (2001) (emphasizing
that mediation’s goal is to effectuate communication between adversarial parties who do
not trust each other; confidentiality makes this communication possible by removing the
threat that disclosures against party self-interest can later be used against them); Lawrence
R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation: The Need for Protection,
2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 37–38 (1986) (explaining that confidentiality is a vital
ingredient to mediation because, among other things, it provides privacy, enables parties to
be candid about deep-seated feelings, and protects unsophisticated parties).
34
Robert Rubinson, Client Counseling, Mediation, and Alternative Narratives of
Dispute Resolution, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 833, 855–58 (2004) (discussing how litigation
resolves conflict by identifying one party as the winner in a contest of competing morality
tales whereas mediation, by framing conflict as a byproduct of normal human conduct
rather than a “disruption of the moral order,” uses party collaboration to achieve common
ground and resolve conflict).
35
LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 15 (3d ed. 2005).
Often, in the context of the courts, the purpose of the mediation and the role of the
mediator are outlined as assisting parties with communication. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §
44.403(4) (West 2004) (“The mediator’s role is to reduce obstacles to communication,
assist in identifying issues, explore alternatives, and otherwise facilitate voluntary
agreements to resolve disputes, without prescribing what the resolution must be.”). But see
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,” 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 61,
86 n.128 (2012) (explaining how “med-arb” is a hybrid process that begins as mediation
and, should any issues not be resolved successfully by the parties themselves, ends with the
neutral third party deciding the matter).
36
There may be unspoken rules about mediation procedure, for example asking the
complainant to open the discussion, but these are not formalized in law like other
procedures that govern the order of closing statements (FED. R. CRIM. P. 29.1), witness
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arbitration, where an arbitrator issues a decision that may or may not be binding on
the parties, mediation gives parties and their representatives space to decide what
arrangements make the most sense for their situation and create tailor-made
solutions; thus, even with similar facts and the same legal standards, mediation
outcomes can be different.37 Moreover, unlike settlement conferences or early
neutral evaluation, there need not be a court case for parties to mediate.38 Thus,
what defines mediation is its informality and adaptability, and it is these qualities
that led to its institutionalization.
III. MEDIATION BECOMES INSTITUTIONALIZED
Mediation has become an integral part of the American legal system over the
past 30 years.39 Once limited to collective bargaining40 and divorce,41 mediation

examination (FED. R. EVID. 611) or courtroom behavior (MISS. UNIF. R. P. JUST. CT. 1.18
(prohibiting behavior intended to irritate or annoy, requiring attorneys and parties to refrain
from making “quips,” etc.)). Formal rules are not the bailiwick of courts alone, but also
extend to private dispute resolution processes like arbitration. See American Arbitration
Association Rules of Procedure, to which parties agree by contract. American Arbitration
Association, www.adr.org [https://perma.cc/98Y2-HM2Q].
37
Some have compared mediation’s capacity for “individualized justice” to the equity
courts of yore. See Thomas O. Main, ADR: The New Equity, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 329, 329
(2005) (noting ADR can fill in for individualized justice and procedural flexibility,
components currently missing from our contemporary civil justice system); Jacqueline M.
Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from Equity Jurisprudence and
Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57, 58 n.14 (2004) (citing Carrie MenkelMeadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or
“The Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1991)); Julie Macfarlane, Culture
Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-Connected Mediation, 2002 J. DISP.
RESOL. 241, 244, 245–46 (2002).
38
Both settlement conferences and early neutral evaluation, commonly used for civil
cases in state and federal courts, utilize judges, magistrate judges, or attorneys, to serve as a
third-party neutral who evaluates strengths and weaknesses of parties’ legal positions and
explores obstacles to settlement. Some early neutral evaluators will also issue a nonbinding
appraisal of the case’s merits. The ABCs of ADR: A Dispute Resolution Glossary, 13
ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 147, 149–50 (1995).
39
Court-connected mediation exists in all fifty states and the federal government.
Court ADR Across the U.S., RSI’S COURT ADR RESOURCE CENTER (Jan. 25, 2016, 6:54
PM),
http://courtadr.org/court-adr-across-the-us/
[https://perma.cc/EH98-99NV];
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651–58 (2012). See also
Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 165, 185–88 (2003);
GOOGLE NGRAM VIEWER, https://books.google.com/ngrams [https://perma.cc/N9A4BAE4] (type “mediation” into the graph-phrase query; then enter “1800” and “2010” in the
time span fields; then use the cursor to hover over the graph until the year 1975 is visible)
(displaying a Google Ngram chart tracking the use of the word “mediation” between 1800
and 2010 that shows the steepest increase starting in 1975 and leveling out in 2003).
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now has widespread application in a range of disputes: small claims,42 family,43
business,44 probate,45 guardianship,46 personal injury,47 medical malpractice,48

40
The federal government created the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in
1947 to “aid and encourage employers and the representatives of their employees to reach
and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working conditions.” 29
U.S.C. § 171 (2012). States also established their own public agencies to assist with
mediating labor disputes. E.g., 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1121-A; Public Employee
Relation Act of 1970, 43 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1101.101 (2009).
41
California first began using court-connected “conciliation” services in 1939
primarily as a means to keep married couples together through reconciliation rather than to
help them divorce. Jay Folberg, Ann L. Milne & Peter Salem, The Evolution of Divorce
and Family Mediation, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND
APPLICATIONS 4–7 (Jay Folberg, Ann L. Milne & Peter Salem eds., 2004).
42
E.g., Susan E. Raitt et al., The Use of Mediation in Small Claims Courts, 9 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 55, 56 (1993).
43
Mediation is used for matters involving child custody, divorce finances, child
dependency, and postadoption contact arrangements. See, e.g., ANDREW I. SCHEPARD,
CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING
FAMILIES 54–62 (2004); Kelly Browe Olson, Lessons Learned from a Child Protection
Mediation Program: If at First You Succeed and Then You Don’t..., 41 FAM. CT. REV. 480,
480–81 (2003); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443,
1498–1507 (1992).
44
See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving
Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in Fortune 1000
Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 18–19, 44–51 (2014); Craig A. McEwen,
Managing Corporate Disputing: Overcoming Barriers to the Effective Use of Mediation
for Reducing the Cost and Time of Litigation, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 4–6
(1998).
45
Lela Porter Love, Mediation of Probate Matters: Leaving a Valuable Legacy, 1
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 255, 256 (2001) (citing Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly:
Using Mediation to Resolve Probate Disputes over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 397, 423–31 (1997)) (explaining that mediation, unlike litigation,
maintains privacy in probate disputes and creates opportunities for family reconciliation).
46
See, e.g., Mary F. Radford, Is the Use of Mediation Appropriate in Adult
Guardianship Cases?, 31 STETSON L. REV. 611, 616–21 (2002); Erica F. Wood, Dispute
Resolution and Dementia: Seeking Solutions, 35 GA. L. REV. 785, 805–08 (2001).
47
Personal injury cases comprised 69% of civil cases from one study of courtannexed mediation in Ohio, the overwhelming majority involving automobile accidents.
Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases: What We Know
from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 652–53 (2002). For a
discussion of mediation in the mass torts context, see Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half
Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal
Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587, 1619–26 (1995).
48
Proponents of mediating medical negligence cases attest that mediation can repair
dysfunctional communication between patients (or patient families) and health care
providers, as well as improve patient safety. Eric Galton, Mediation of Medical Negligence
Claims, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 321–24 (2000); Chris Stern Hyman, Mediation and
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labor and employment,49 education,50 bioethics,51 environmental,52 community,53
and in criminal cases.54 Now mediation is connected with state and federal courts

Medical Malpractice: Why Plaintiffs, Hospitals and Physicians Should Be at the Table, 66
DISP. RESOL. J. 32, 32–33 (2011); Carol B. Liebman, Medical Malpractice Mediation:
Benefits Gained, Opportunities Lost, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 136 (2011). Others
suggest that face-to-face, interest-based discussions in mediation are the exception, not the
rule. See Sheila M. Johnson, A Medical Malpractice Litigator Proposes Mediation, 52
DISP. RESOL. J. 42, 45–46 (1997) (noting that what states like Wisconsin call “mediation”
is instead a prescreening or evaluation process, designed to weed out claims without legal
merit); Tamara Relis, Consequences of Power, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 445, 446 (2007).
For example, some critics point to the incentives that make doctors disinclined to settle
claims. Haavi Morreim, Malpractice, Mediation, and Moral Hazard: The Virtues of
Dodging the Data Bank, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 109, 111–13 (2012).
49
See, e.g., Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Mediation at Work: Transforming Workplace
Conflict at the United States Postal Service, in TRANSFORMATIVE MEDIATION: A
SOURCEBOOK, RESOURCES FOR CONFLICT INTERVENTION PRACTITIONERS AND PROGRAMS
321 (Joseph P. Folger et al. eds., 2010); Deborah A. Schmedemann, Reconciling
Differences: The Theory and Law of Mediating Labor Grievances, 9 INDUS. REL. L. J. 523,
525 (1987); Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best Procedure for Enforcing Employment
Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1405–06 (2004);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The NLRA’s Legacy: Collective or Individual Dispute Resolution
or Not?, 26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 249, 249 (2011).
50
Under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), states must
provide procedures like mediation to address and resolve complaints involving a child’s
individualized education plan. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2012); Nancy A. Welsh, Stepping Back
Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real Disputants About
Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 573, 612–19
(2004). For a discussion of peer mediation in schools, see Nancy A. Burrell, Cindy S.
Zirbel & Mike Allen, Evaluating Peer Mediation Outcomes in Educational Settings: A
Meta-Analytic Review, 21 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 7, 7–8 (2003).
51
See generally NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & CAROL B. LIEBMAN, BIOETHICS
MEDIATION: A GUIDE TO SHAPING SHARED SOLUTIONS xiii–xiv (rev. and expanded ed.,
2004) (arguing mediation can be a forum for physicians, patients, and families to
communicate and together make decisions about life and death).
52
See generally LAWRENCE S. BACOW & MICHAEL WHEELER, ENVIRONMENTAL
DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984). For a case study of mediation as public policy, see Janet C.
Neuman, Run, River, Run: Mediation of a Water-Rights Dispute Keeps Fish and Farmers
Happy—For a Time, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 259, 259–61 (1996).
53
See Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner, Introduction to THE POSSIBILITY OF
POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4
(Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1993). Community mediation centers often address
disputes early, before court intervention, or disputes that, for whatever reason, do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the courts or public agencies. See, e.g., Clark Freshman,
Privatizing Same-Sex “Marriage” Through Alternative Dispute Resolution: CommunityEnhancing Versus Community-Enabling Mediation, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1687, 1689–91
(1997).
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and at both trial and appellate levels. Mediation is also used by many
administrative agencies in their quasi-judicial55 and quasi-legislative rule-making
activities.56 And in the private sector, businesses now include mediation clauses in
contracts with each other, with their customers, and with their employees, in case
future disputes arise.57
The “institutionalization” of mediation, a term used to describe how public
and private entities have adopted mediation as a standard and legitimate process
for resolving disputes,58 has historic origins in court reform. To appreciate the
growth of mediation, especially its emergence as substance-specific procedure in
state legislation, this Article must go back to the judicial reform movement in the
last quarter of the twentieth century. The first section of this Part briefly explains
the perceived shortcomings with judicial dispute resolution that reformers sought
to repair with alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”). The second section then
focuses specifically on mediation and the arguments that drove its
institutionalization: improved efficiency and quality of justice.

54

See, e.g., Mark S. Umbreit, Robert B. Coates & Betty Vos, Victim-Offender
Mediation: Three Decades of Practice and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 279
(2004) (describing victim-offender mediation process as “interested victims of primarily
property crimes and minor assaults . . . meet the juvenile or adult offender, in a safe and
structured setting, with the goal of holding the offender directly accountable for his or her
behavior”); Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve Criminal Cases: A
Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247, 1248–49 (1994) (noting that victim-offender
mediation (VOM) “transforms the criminal justice paradigm by placing victims at the
center, rather than on the periphery, of the criminal process. In effect, VOM transfers the
power to resolve all or part of a criminal case from the state to a private party—the
victim.”).
55
See, e.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2260.052 (West 2008) (mandating rule-making
agencies in state government to develop negotiation and mediation rules).
56
This takes the form of negotiated rule-making or “neg-reg” (see, e.g., CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 21168.5, 21168.6 (West 1995)). In 1990, the federal government passed the
Negotiated Rulemaking Act, which permitted agencies to engage a third-party neutral to
facilitate rule development, and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, which
encouraged administrative agencies to use mediation for interagency or agency-public
controversies. ALFINI ET AL., supra note 14, at 29–30.
57
Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 44, at 18–22.
58
Some consider institutionalized mediation only as court-connected mediation
requiring parties to mediate prior to a formal court hearing. E.g., Bobbi McAdoo, Nancy A.
Welsh & Roselle L. Wissler, Institutionalization: What Do Empirical Studies Tell Us About
Court Mediation?, 9 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 8, 8 (2003). Others expand the definition of
institutionalized mediation to include mediation that takes place in, or is connected to, all
public institutions including courts, administrative agencies, and public schools. E.g.,
Nancy A. Welsh & Peter T. Coleman, Institutionalized Conflict Resolution: Have We
Come to Expect Too Little?, 18 NEGOT. J. 345, 346 (2002). This Article prefers the
broadest conception of institutionalization, which is when any entity adopts mediation “as a
part of doing business.” Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of
Mediation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 903, 904 (1997).
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A. Responding to Popular Dissatisfaction with the Courts
The history of mediation’s institutionalization begins with the modern59
American judicial reform movement of the mid-1970s and early 1980s.60 During
this judicial reform period, jurists and legal scholars sought to improve delivery of
just settlements and to rehabilitate the popular legitimacy of courts61 through the
use of alternative methods of dispute resolution.62 The goals of the judicial reform
movement were to employ new approaches to dispute processing, so-called
“process pluralism,” in order to relieve pressure on congested courts by reducing
delay and eradicating unnecessary costs; involving communities in dispute

59

Earlier efforts to reform the American judicial system took place during the
Progressive Era of the 1880s to 1920s. During this period, much like their successors in the
1970s, reformers argued that legal formalism was responsible for court congestion and
procedural delays and looked to less formal processes like arbitration as a solution. Roscoe
Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 ANN.
REP. A.B.A. 395, 397 (1906).
60
Professor Frank Sander refers to this time of experimentation in forms of ADR as
“Let a thousand flowers bloom,” Frank E.A. Sander, The Future of ADR, 2000 J. DISP.
RESOL. 3, 3–4 (2000), perhaps alluding to Mao Zedong’s “Hundred Flowers Campaign,” a
brief period of intellectual and artistic liberalization by China’s Communist Party in 1956.
JUNG CHANG, WILD SWANS: THREE DAUGHTERS OF CHINA 211–12 (1991). Some identify
the beginning of the modern ADR movement with the 1976 “National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice,” also called the
Pound Conference. Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the U.S., Agenda for 2000 A.D. –
Need for Systematic Anticipation, Keynote Address at the National Conference on the
Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7, 1976), in 15
JUDGES J. 27 (1976); THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE
(A. Leo Levine & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on
Judicial ADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty: Fait Accompli, Failed Overture,
or Fledgling Adulthood?, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 297, 309 (1996).
61
CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT 9–10 (1985). Some members of the
judiciary thought the adversarial process had gone too far, causing erosion of important
societal values like truth and justice. See, e.g., Dorothy W. Nelson, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: A Supermart for Law Reform, 14 N.M. L. REV. 467, 468 (1984) (quoting Chief
Justice Warren Burger as saying the use of adversarial processes as the primary means of
resolving disputes is “a mistake that must be corrected . . . . For some disputes, trials will
be the only means, but for many claims, trials by adversarial contest must in time go the
way of the ancient trial by battle and blood. Our system is too costly, too painful, too
destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people.”).
62
Frank E.A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U.
FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (1985) (explaining that the term “alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms” refers to methods of dispute settlement that are “alternatives” to, not a
replacement of, court adjudication).

374

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

settlement processes; enabling more people to access justice; and making dispute
resolution more effective.63
Some judicial reformers advocated delegalizing formal judicial procedures
and creating “multi-door courthouses”64 and “community courts”65 that could offer
a range of dispute settlement processes and allow for better quality of justice
depending on the nature of the dispute and the needs of the parties.66 Others sought
to capture disputes that never made it to the courts67 and instead channel them to
informal and nonadversarial community-based settings such as Neighborhood
Justice Centers.68 Both sets of reformers focused on mediation as an alternative
method for dispute resolution,69 the former group seeking to incorporate mediation

63

Seth Hufstedler & Paul Nejelski, A.B.A Action Commission Challenges Litigation
Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A. J. 965, 965–69 (1980); Sander, supra note 62, at 3. See
generally Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of Civil
Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 WISC. L. REV. 893, 895–907
(1984) (providing an excellent contemporary discussion of, and literature review
presenting, the different views on judicial reform).
64
Frank E.A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Resolution, Address at the National
Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
(Apr. 7–9, 1976), in 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976), at 111.
65
John C. Cratsley, Community Courts: Offering Alternative Dispute Resolution
Within the Judicial System, 3 VT. L. REV. 1, 2–19 (1978).
66
HARRINGTON, supra note 61, at 15.
67
Researchers in the 1970s asked why so many individuals who suffered harm either
never perceived their injury or never pursued remedies by bringing grievances to courts, a
phenomenon they termed “grievance apathy” and identified as a complicating problem for
access to justice reformers. William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The
Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming…, 15 L. & SOC’Y
REV. 631, 633–37 (1980).
68
HARRINGTON, supra note 61, at 29–31; Kimberlee K. Kovach, Privatization of
Dispute Resolution: In the Spirit of Pound, but Mission Incomplete: Lessons Learned and a
Possible Blueprint for the Future, 48 S. TEXAS L. REV. 1003, 1010–11 (2007); Raymond
Shonholtz, Justice from Another Perspective: The Ideology and Developmental History of
the Community Boards Program, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 53,
at 202. Critics, particularly from the political left, argued that Neighborhood Justice
Centers were an extension of state power, not an exercise of popular justice at all. Richard
L. Abel, Expanding State Control, in POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 7
(arguing that informal justice merely disguises state coercion by removing traditional
symbols of state prosecution—the male judge, the raised dais, the robes and security
personnel); RICHARD HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE
EXPANSION OF THE INFORMAL STATE 3 (1987).
69
Although mediation proved popular among reformers of this period, other ADR
processes like arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and summary jury trials were also
promoted. Kovach, supra note 68, at 1007. Sociologist Roger Cotterell aptly characterizes
efforts to make legal remedies more accessible to more people as “less concerned with
increasing citizen access to existing legal institutions than with the possibility of changing
legal institutions to bring them closer to citizens.” ROGER COTTERELL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
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into courts and the latter seeking to establish dispute settlement programs that,
though external to courts, were complementary to the judicial system.70
B. Delivering Quality Resolution Faster
Legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies incorporated mediation into
public institutions at a time when reformers sought to make the state’s dispute
processing more accessible, efficient, effective, and just. Mediation’s ability to
provide an informal, consensus-based process, with a neutral third-party facilitator,
made it popular among reformers. Those advocating for mediation to advance
judicial reform goals relied on two primary arguments, often referred to in the
literature as “the production argument” and “the quality argument.”71
1. The Production Argument
The production argument posited that ADR processes like mediation would
be less costly and more efficient than litigation. A perceived “explosion” of
litigation was believed to clog courts and render “legal justice . . . costly, slow, and
as a result, inaccessible.”72 Reformers theorized that by providing disputants with
alternative avenues to settlement, like mediation, courts could help parties resolve
disputes without lengthy discovery, litigation costs, and time spent attending court
hearings.73 And, presumably, since parties in mediation reached mutual agreement

LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 291–92 (2d ed., 1992) (noting that the informalism movement,
which sought to provide access to inexpensive “popular justice,” also coincided with the
distinct delegalization movement, which emphasized mediation and negotiation in dispute
processing rather than relying on formal rules and procedures).
70
Richard Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System
of Criminal Justice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1973). See also Robert A. Baruch Bush,
Staying in Orbit, or Breaking Free: The Relationship of Mediation to the Courts over Four
Decades, 84 N.D. L. REV. 705, 705–09 (2008) (providing an insightful discussion of the
relationship between mediation and the courts since the 1960s).
71
Marc Galanter, “. . . A Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge:” Judicial Mediation in
the United States, 12 J. L. & SOC’Y 1, 8 (1985).
72
Austin Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Access to Justice, and Court Reform:
Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 319, 321–22 (1985). It is
important to note that scholars like Austin Sarat and Marc Galanter questioned the
assumption that American society had become so unreasonably litigious as to cause a
“litigation explosion” requiring court reform. They instead suggested that the volume of
court cases served as a measure of judicial involvement in society’s dispute resolution. Id.
at 329; Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t
Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4, 10–11 (1983).
73
See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Is Mediation Less Expensive? Comparison of Mediated
and Adversarial Divorce Costs, 8 MEDIATION Q. 15, 20–21 (1990) (describing a study of
Northern California divorce cases for which the average cost of adjudication for a
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on how to settle the dispute, they would be more likely to comply with the terms of
their agreement, thus reducing costs associated with enforcement claims or
appeals. Some contemporary evaluations of mediation programs supported the
efficiency assertions made by judicial reformers. For example, a 1977 study of
mediated and nonmediated small claims cases in six district courts in Maine found
that within six to eight weeks following resolution, 72.8% of mediated outcomes
resulted in full compliance and 10.5% in noncompliance, whereas only 35% of
adjudicated outcomes resulted in full compliance and almost half in
noncompliance.74 Furthermore, reformers believed that, with more cases resolved
in mediation, the administrative and personnel costs for courts, and assumedly the
burden on taxpayers, would also likely be reduced. A 1981 study of contested
child-custody cases in Denver found reductions in public sector costs (between
$5,610 and $27,510 per 100 cases) by processing cases with mediation instead of
an adversarial process.75

divorcing couple was higher ($12,226) than the cost of a “comprehensive” mediation that
included attorney consultation ($5,234)); Robert F. Peckham, A Judicial Response to the
Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative
Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253, 265, 267–69 (1985) (“Justice is becoming
ever more inaccessible to the poor and middle class; the disparity of resources between
parties in a case is often determinative of its outcome.”). See also Frank E.A. Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 60, at 66–68, 72–
79; Sander, supra note 62, at 3; Luban, supra note 14, at 401.
74
Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Mediation in Small Claims Court:
Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11, 16, 21 (1984). Cf.
Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research Results,
19 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 470–71 (1985) (citing contradictory results in two
studies of divorcing couples who resolved their disputes either through mediation or the
adversarial system, noting that “while mediation may not always be more effective than
adjudication in preventing relitigation, it certainly does not produce a rash of such
activity”).
75
Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, The Benefits Outweigh the Costs, FAM.
ADVOC., Winter 1982, at 28. Cost savings to the public have also been supported by some
more recent assessments. JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE CTS., EVALUATION
OF THE EARLY MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAMS xxi–xxii (2004), http://www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/empprept.pdf [https://perma.cc/CM8T-TBA5] (discussing a 2004 survey of
California early-mediation programs that found programs reduced the courts’ workload by
dropping demand for judges’ time for hearing motions and other pretrial court events; and
the total potential savings ranged from $1.4 million/year (San Diego), to $400,000/year
(Los Angeles), and $9,700 (Sonoma), with savings in other jurisdictions offset by increases
in case management conferences); TERESA G. CAMPBELL & SHARON L. PIZZUTI,
COURTLAND CONSULTING, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CASE EVALUATION AND MEDIATION IN
MICHIGAN CIRCUIT COURTS 29–31 (2011) (discussing a study of both mediation and early
case evaluation for civil cases in Michigan that showed that mediation generally reduces
costs to the court (saving expense associated with trials, but still proving time-consuming
for court staff to manage) and that mediation, while initially a more expensive option for
litigants, ultimately reduced overall costs).
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Mediation could aid the reform goal of efficiency by providing a helpful
structure for settlement negotiations.76 In contrast to direct party negotiations that
occur in fits and starts, the mediation process injects a sense of decorum by
creating a meeting time and place for the parties to sit down together,77 often
sharing the same meeting space and table.78 Mediation advocates observed that,
with the structure mediation imposes on negotiations, negotiations can become less
adversarial, false assumptions can be corrected, and unreasonable demands (from
clients and opposing parties) can be checked by mediators asking questions and
clarifying meaning.79 Mediation could thus overcome informational barriers by
enabling direct, confidential communication among parties and their lawyers.80
2. The Quality Argument
The second argument made for institutionalizing mediation, the “quality
argument,” reasoned that mediation yielded better outcomes than litigation by
empowering parties in the process. Mediation, as a consensual process, could give
parties control over how their conflicts would be resolved. Putting parties in a
position to develop their own resolution could yield customized outcomes that
responded to their specific needs. Indeed, parties in mediation might develop

76

Indeed, mediation is often called “assisted” negotiation. See, e.g., Robert M.
Ackerman, Disputing Together: Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 18
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 71 (2002). Because most disputes are resolved not by
judge- or jury-rendered decisions, but instead through settlement negotiations, many
thought that improving out-of-court negotiations would also reduce reliance on courts.
Thus, on the one hand, advocates for reform perceived mediation’s value, relative to
adjudication, as its informal and less-structured procedure while, on the other hand, they
saw mediation’s value relative to direct party negotiations as the imposition of formality
and structure. Robert A. Baruch Bush, “What Do We Need a Mediator For?”: Mediation’s
“Value-Added” for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 5–6 (1996). Cf. Luban,
supra note 14, at 396 (affirming that the mere presence of a neutral party who has the
power, even if never exercised, to influence negotiation puts ADR into an entirely different
system than unmediated negotiation).
77
Craig A. McEwan, Nancy H. Rogers & Richard J. Maiman, Bring in the Lawyers:
Challenging the Dominant Approaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79
MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1369–70 (1995). It is important not to overlook the mundane—a
scheduled mediation creates a time and a place for negotiation, which has the potential to
help busy attorneys focus and prepare more thoroughly than ad hoc conversations with the
other side. Id. at 1387.
78
This is not always the case. In some forms of mediation—for example, in highconflict family cases—the mediator never brings the disputing parties together and instead
relies on shuttle diplomacy to facilitate negotiations.
79
McEwan et al., supra note 77, at 1367–68, 1370–71, 1379.
80
Bush, supra note 76, at 12–15.
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creative remedies that courts did not have the power to provide.81 Engaging and
including parties in the exercise of crafting their own resolution had important
procedural justice implications82—it could help parties feel more empowered and
lead to heightened morale.83 Mediation advocates argued that establishing trust and
communication would positively transform the parties’ relationship and prevent
future conflict.84 Indeed, when aggregated, the positive effects of mediation could
improve civil discourse85 and society as a whole.86
Although the arguments that mediation could alleviate pressure on court
dockets, reduce costs, and also yield more satisfying resolution of disputes proved
persuasive,87 the institutionalization of mediation did not move forward without

81

Menkel-Meadow, supra note 37, at 7 (“[T]he ‘limited remedial imagination’ of
courts in providing outcomes restricts what possible solutions the parties could develop.”);
see also Main, supra note 37.
82
E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 101–06 (1988) (proposing that individuals find processes fairer when given an
opportunity to speak and tell their story); Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia
Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 172
(2002) (arguing that fairness, from a disputant’s perspective, is closely connected to
meaningful opportunities to tell one’s story and have that story be received with dignity
and in an even-handed manner).
83
A special workshop, “Identifying and Measuring the Quality of Dispute Resolution
Processes and Outcomes,” hosted by the University of Wisconsin’s Dispute Processing
Research Program in 1987, yielded insightful papers including Robert A. Baruch Bush,
Defining Quality in Dispute Resolution: Taxonomies and Anti-Taxonomies of Quality
Arguments, 66 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 351 n.33 (1989) (connecting arguments of ADR
practitioners and advocates to the six general definitions of “quality in dispute resolution
processes or outcomes” developed out of the workshop).
84
See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF
MEDIATION: THE TRANSFORMATIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICT 41–84 (2005) (describing the
way in which mediation interrupts the negative conflict spiral of disempowerment and
demonization).
85
See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a
Post-Modern, Multi-Cultural World, 1 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 49, 69–72
(1996); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Deliberative Democracy and Conflict Resolution: Two
Theories and Practices of Participation in the Polity, 12 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18, 18 (2005).
86
Ackerman, supra note 76, at 31, 51, 71–75 (explaining that consensus-based
processes build community because they are participant driven).
87
Interestingly, perhaps with the exception of the studies cited earlier, the production
argument has not borne out over time, but the quality argument has. See Donna
Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution Procedures:
Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549,
560–62, 560 n.37, 563–66 (2008) (“[E]mpirical evidence to-date offers little support for the
idea that ADR reduces docket overload or promotes court efficiency.”); see also id. at 563
(“Research has rather consistently shown that ADR subjectively appeals to ordinary
citizens. They regard ADR procedures as fair and value them for providing an opportunity
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plenty of skepticism. Many voices challenged the premise that ADR could improve
access to justice for societies’ marginalized groups, such as communities of color,
women, and the socioeconomically disadvantaged.88
Nevertheless, across the country, during the 1980s and 1990s, state89 and
federal90 courts and administrative agencies built mediation programs, either under
their own initiative or at the behest of legislatures. Consider, for example,
Oklahoma’s Dispute Resolution Act of 1983, the purpose of which was to
“provide . . . convenient access to dispute resolution proceedings which are fair,
effective, inexpensive, and expeditious.”91 With this law, the Oklahoma legislature
authorized “[a]ny county, municipality, accredited law school or agency of this
state” to establish mediation programs and tasked the Administrative Director of
the Courts to administer the programs and “promulgate rules and regulations.”92
Today, most public institutions employ their own mediators,93 contract with private

for voice and process control which promote self-determination.”); Wissler, supra note 47,
at 660–73.
88
See, e.g., Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (“[T]o protect
minorities, ADR should be reserved for disputes in which parties of comparable status and
power confront each other.”); Lisa G. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The
Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 57–
61 (1984); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100
YALE L.J. 1545, 1547–51 (1991); Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce Mediation
and the Politics of Power, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 441, 441–46 (1992); Eric K. Yamamoto, ADR:
Where Have the Critics Gone?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1055, 1058–66 (1996).
89
For a discussion of how states establish statewide mediation programs, see Sharon
Press, Building and Maintaining a Statewide Mediation Program: A View from the Field,
81 KY. L.J. 1029, 1029–35 (1992). Although Professor Press wrote this article when the
institutionalization of mediation in courts and administrative agencies was gaining
momentum, her analysis and considerations remain relevant decades later.
90
At the federal level, the U.S. Congress passed the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act in 1998 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 651), authorizing all federal courts to develop ADR
programs and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act in 1990 (codified as 5 U.S.C. §
571), which requires each federal administrative agency to adopt a policy addressing the
use of ADR and to promote the use of ADR whenever appropriate.
91
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1801 (2015) (“The Legislature is aware of the fact that
many disputes arise between citizens of this state which are of small social or economic
magnitude and can be both costly and time consuming if resolved through a formal judicial
proceeding. Many times such disputes can be resolved in a fair and equitable manner
through less formal proceedings. Such proceedings can also help alleviate the backlog of
cases which burden the judicial system in this state. It is therefore the purpose of this act to
provide to all citizens of this state convenient access to dispute resolution proceedings
which are fair, effective, inexpensive, and expeditious.”).
92
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1803(A) (2015). For an example of such rules and
regulations, see KENTUCKY’S MODEL MEDIATION RULES (2012), http://courts.ky.gov/court
programs/mediation/Pages/modelmediation.aspx [https://perma.cc/HA47-NRHA].
93
See, e.g., U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ca9.us
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mediators for mediation services,94 or refer disputing parties to a freestanding
mediation center.95 Across the country, almost all parties that turn to state
institutions to resolve civil disputes are required to participate in some form of
ADR and demonstrate their efforts to settle the dispute before a judge or agency
decision maker will hear the case.96
IV. LEGISLATURES EXPAND BREADTH AND DEPTH OF THEIR MEDIATION
MANDATES
In recent years, particularly since the early 2000s, legislatures have
increasingly deployed mediation as a means to regulate private parties’ dispute
resolution. This phenomenon is a distinct departure from legislatures’ previous role
in institutionalizing mediation. In earlier phases of mediation’s institutionalization,
legislatures enacted statutes authorizing courts and administrative agencies to
develop mediation programs, as the Oklahoma example above illustrates. Now,
legislatures also embed mandatory mediation clauses directly into substantive
law.97 Parties must mediate in order to assert or defend rights under statutes
governing, for example, certain kinds of commercial contracts, insurance coverage,
property transactions, and employment.98

courts.gov/mediation/view.php?pk_id=0000000676
[https://perma.cc/BL59-VCNK]
(showing the Ninth Circuit has its own mediators who all work exclusively for the Court of
Appeals).
94
Wissler, supra note 47, at 654; see, e.g., 5-1-2 VT. CODE R. § 2, rules promulgated
pursuant to VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6252 (2015) (Vermont’s Department of Housing and
Community Development, which maintains a roster of mediators for rental disputes).
95
Press, supra note 89, at 1041–48; see, e.g., Administrative Order No. 09-08 (Fla.
11th Jud. Cir. Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.jud11.flcourts.org/documents/Administrative_
Orders/1-09-08-Establishment%20of%20HOME%20Mediation%20Program.pdf [https://
perma.cc/F2PW-HY7T].
96
COLE ET AL., supra note 1.
97
This form of embedded procedure or substantive law with tailored procedure is
different from the much discussed and debated issue of substance-specific procedure, by
which certain federal rules of civil procedure are modified for particular kinds of claims.
Not only are these statutes appearing at the state, not federal, level, but also the mandate to
mediate appears directly in substantive statutory regimes. For more discussion and
background into the debate around transsubstantive procedure versus substance-specific
procedure, see Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the
Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 27–29 (1994);
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Halting Devolution or Bleak to the Future: Subrin’s New-Old
Procedure as a Possible Antidote to Dreyfuss’s Tolstoy Problem, 46 FLA. L. REV. 57, 58–
60 (1994); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay
on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 377–78
(2010).
98
Some statutory mediation mandates appear to do more than push parties to discuss
settlement and in fact work to advance substantive policy objectives. For example, in the
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Legislatures use mediation to regulate disputing parties in two different ways.
First, they build mandatory mediation requirements into specific statutes to
manage private citizens’ disputes directly, even before they turn to the government
for assistance.99 Second, not only do legislatures mandate that parties mediate
specific disputes, but they also instruct parties on how to mediate. Rather than
leaving the mediation process unspecified or, in the alternative, delegating to
courts and administrative agencies the task of developing rules for mediation,
legislatures themselves design mediation procedure by building additional legal
requirements into statutes. Through these mediation statutes, the legislature
extends the breadth and depth of its control over private-party dispute processing.
This Part explores both categories of statutory regulation. Section A presents
statutes that embed mediation as mandatory dispute resolution procedure. These
statutes impose a legal obligation to mediate on parties with certain kinds of
disputes. Section B demonstrates that many statutory mandates to mediate go
beyond requiring parties to try settling their disputes in mediation. Some
legislatures, when constructing statutory mediation requirements, tack on
additional legal obligations that control parties’ settlement negotiations and shape
the outcome of the mediation process. Not only do these laws directly regulate
parties’ behavior in mediation, but they can also influence the parties’ relationship
by creating leverage and incentivizing settlement. These requirements transform
mediation from its classical conception as an informal, delegalized, outcomeneutral process—what made mediation so popular during the judicial reform
movement—into a highly structured, formal process, with rules and procedures
spelled out in statute.
A. Mandating Mediation for Specific Disputes
States create legal obligations for private parties to mediate in a variety of
contexts, including disputes relating to commercial contracts, insurance coverage,
property rights, employment, and health.100 Many of these statutory mediation

foreclosure context, mediation statutes were passed with the intent to stop foreclosures, to
save homeowners, and buoy the local housing market. See, e.g., H.R. 58, 146th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2011) (discussing the policy statement in Delaware House Bill
58, Courts and Judicial Procedures—Foreclosure—Mediation). Lawmakers’ decision to
deploy mediation for substantive public policy purposes is beyond the scope of this
particular Article, but a topic I have explored elsewhere. Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in
Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
1889, 1891, 1908 (2013).
99
COLE ET AL., supra note 1.
100
This Article focuses on statutes that mandate one or both parties to use mediation
(using the search term “shall mediate”), particularly those that relate directly to private
disputing parties in civil matters, although some statutes mandate mediation between
private and public entities (e.g., Pennsylvania’s tax collection statute (53 PA. STAT. AND
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6924.505 (2015)). Statutes that are not substance-specific are
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requirements appear to have developed organically, in an ad hoc fashion, perhaps
to respond to concerns about local industry practices, advocacy for consumer
protection, or a desire to alleviate civil court dockets.
One common area in which states deploy these statutory mediation mandates
involves disputes between private commercial contracting parties, often relating to
manufacturing and distribution contracts. For example, agricultural cooperatives in
Maine and the handlers of their agricultural products,101 or electricity cooperatives
in Texas and the cable operators who erect electric utility poles, all have a statutory
requirement to mediate disputes.102 Florida, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin require
mediation for disputes involving motor vehicle manufacturers and franchise car
dealers.103 Maryland regulates private contracts between beer manufacturers and
beer distributors. It requires mediation if a new entity takes over the manufacturing
and wants to replace the old distributor with a new distributor, but the two
distributors, old and new, cannot agree on a buyout amount for the distribution
contract.104 Illinois requires telecommunications carriers to mediate with
consumers upon request;105 similarly, Michigan requires informal alternative
dispute resolution, including mediation, for complaints valued under $1,000
brought against telecommunication carriers.106 In almost all of these contract
disputes, the mediation mandate attaches directly to the parties, without the
requirement of filing a claim with a court or administrative agency.
Many states also impose legal obligations to mediate absent state institutional
intervention in the insurance context. For example, claims involving condominium
insurance in Washington,107 hazardous waste liability insurance in Oregon,108 and
fire, earthquake and automobile insurance in California,109 are all subject to
statutory mediation requirements. Similarly, in Texas, disputes over

excluded (e.g., statutes generally regulating mediators’ qualifications and experience, the
effect of mediation on tolling of statutes of limitations, confidentiality and privileged
mediation communications, as well as how mediation programs should be administered).
101
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1958-B (2015).
102
TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. § 252.005 (West 2015).
103
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 320.3210 (2015); TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 2301.522 (West
2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1572.2 (West 2015); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 218.0136 (West
2015). Virginia, unlike Texas, mandates mediation only when one of the parties requests
mediation.
104
MD. CODE ANN. art. 2B, § 21-103 (2015). These mediations might be more aptly
called “beer summits.”
105
220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/13-713 (West 2013).
106
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 484.2203a (West 2008).
107
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.35.605 (West 2007) (requiring mediation of
condominium insurance claims if the claimant (condominium unit owner or homeowners’
association) and the insurer have not been able to resolve the claim and one of the parties
requests mediation).
108
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 465.484 (West 2013).
109
CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.70 (West 2013) (making mediation mandatory only if one
of the parties requests it).

2016]

MEDIATION AS REGULATION

383

reimbursement of out-of-network health insurance claims must also be
mediated.110
In addition to mandating mediation for conflicts between parties to a
commercial or insurance contract, state legislatures also mandate that private
parties mediate various disputes involving property rights. Legislatures in a
number of nonjudicial foreclosure states111—for example, Hawaii,112
Washington,113 and Nevada114—require mediation between eligible homeowners
and mortgage lender representatives before the property can be sold at auction.115
Multiple states require any construction defect issues to be mediated before a suit
can be filed.116 In Hawaii, if a party to a dispute involving a condominium117 or
planned community association118 requests mediation, the other party is legally
obligated to participate. Gun shooting range operators in Vermont must mediate
with neighboring property owners,119 and private solid waste facility licensees in
Maine must use mediation if they cannot establish an agreement with their host
community.120 Furthermore, real estate brokers in Colorado have a legal obligation
to mediate with property owners in the event they dispute the commission for
leasing commercial real estate.121 Legislators in Vermont and Washington enacted
a law requiring landlords and tenants in mobile home parks to mediate eviction
disputes. The landlord’s failure to participate in good faith is a legal defense to
eviction.122 California and Oregon also mandate mediation of disputes between
archeologists and American Indian tribes regarding repatriation of disinterred

110

TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.056 (West 2012). An interesting thing to note is that
parties may already be negotiating over insurance claims even without this statutory
requirement to mediate. In which case, these mandates to mediate pull private discussions
into the public sphere by laying down rules by which the negotiations should occur.
111
Nonjudicial foreclosure allows lender representatives to initiate foreclosure
privately, without obtaining an order of the court, as long as they comply with notice
requirements.
112
HAW. REV. STAT. Ann. § 667-71 (LexisNexis 2012); see id. § 667-74.
113
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.030 (West 2007).
114
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.086 (LexisNexis 2007).
115
Nussbaum, supra note 98, at 1919–1944.
116
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.55.120 (West 2007); CAL. CIV. CODE § 910 (West
2007); id. § 919 (imposing a legal obligation on the contractor to include an offer to
mediate with the offer to repair); HAW. REV. STAT. § 672E-1; see HAW. REV. STAT. §
672E-7; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.680 (LexisNexis 2012).
117
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 514B-161 (West 2016).
118
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421J-13 (LexisNexis 2008); see also NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38.330 (LexisNexis 2013) (requiring mediation whether a party has requested it or
not).
119
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5227a (2011).
120
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1310-N (West 2014).
121
COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-22.5-101 (2015).
122
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6252; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.20.080 (West 2015).
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human skeletal remains or burial goods.123 Although the circumstances of these
property-related disputes differ, each is governed by a statutory regime that legally
requires affected parties to try resolving their disagreements in mediation before
engaging state institutions for help.
Statutory mandates to mediate without or before institutional intervention also
appear in health-related disputes. For example, several state statutes require
mediation of all causes of action for injuries arising from healthcare services.124 In
New York, physicians at mental health facilities who believe a “do not resuscitate”
order is no longer appropriate, but the individual who originally granted consent
for the order refuses to revoke it, must submit the dispute to mediation or transfer
the patient to another physician.125 In Florida, nursing home residents or their
survivors who allege rights violations or negligence by the nursing home facility
must complete a strict pre-suit process, laid out in detail by statute, which includes
mandatory mediation.126 Individuals with complaints against adult family-care
homes in Florida must also mediate if they want to recover attorney fees.127 As in
the case of commercial, insurance, or property disputes, each particular statutory
mediation scheme is specific to certain types of health disputes.
Finally, there are mediation requirements relating to employment. In
Colorado, for example, the state legislature passed the “Workplace
Accommodations for Nursing Mothers Act,” which grants nursing mothers a legal
right to pump or breast feed at the workplace and requires employers to make
reasonable efforts to accommodate this right.128 Should a working mother believe
her employer is violating her rights under the law, she must first mediate with her
employer before initiating formal litigation.129
These examples are by no means an exhaustive list. They serve to illustrate
how legislatures impose mediation mandates directly on parties, rather than
delegating that decision to courts and public agencies, as a means of encouraging
resolution of a wide range of private disputes.
B. Controlling and Incentivizing Mediation Behavior
As legislators increasingly embed mediation mandates into substantive
statutes, many also specify in statute how the disputants shall utilize or behave in
the mediation. Statutes regulate parties in mediation by 1) controlling who can and

123

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8012 (West 2007) (describing dispute settlement
process via mediation at id. § 8016(c)–(j)); OR. REV. STAT. § 390.240(1)(b) (2013).
124
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100 (West
2015) (stating that health care provider includes everyone from East Asian medicine
practitioners to midwives, opticians, and paramedics).
125
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney 2012).
126
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233 (West 2012).
127
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 429.87 (West 2013).
128
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-13.5-101 (West 2015).
129
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.5-104(5) (2012).
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cannot participate; 2) mandating information exchange; 3) requiring parties to take
negotiations seriously; 4) prescribing topics for discussion; 5) making mediation a
condition precedent to a formal proceeding; and 6) incentivizing settlement.130 This
type of regulation, whether purposeful or inadvertent, transforms mediation into a
highly formalized, choreographed process with built-in procedural rules, rights,
and restrictions.
1. Who Participates in Mediation
Some statutes dictate who shall and who shall not participate in the mandatory
mediation. In situations where one of the parties is an organization or business
entity, policymakers will require an individual with settlement authority either to
be physically present or participate by phone during the mediation.131 If it is
unclear which parties are essential for resolving the dispute, some states deputize
the mediator with the power to determine which parties are necessary for
“effective” mediation.132 One purpose for requiring someone with settlement
authority to participate in the mediation is to ensure that agreements reached in
mediation are final and can indeed entirely conclude the matter in dispute.
Statutes may also prohibit certain individuals, like legal counsel, from
participating. For example, the state of California instructs mediators in insurance
disputes to determine whether the insured party will be represented by legal
counsel at the mediation and, if not, prohibits any legal counsel from being present
in the mediation.133 One hypothesis for this policy is that legislatures may be trying
to level the ground between the parties and avoid a “repeat player” phenomenon or
situations in which one party has inherent bargaining advantage due to familiarity
with the mediation process or greater legal sophistication.134

130

Some statutes have only one of these characteristics, while others have them all.
For example, Nevada’s nonjudicial foreclosure mediation statute prescribes how and when
parties shall mediate. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.086 (LexisNexis 2011).
131
See 53 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT ANN. § 6924.505(k)(2)(iii) (West 2008)
(mandating mediation for tax-collection disputes and requiring parties in attendance at
mediation to have official authorization to settle the matter).
132
E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A (2014) (stating that a “mediator shall
include in the mediation process . . . any person the mediator determines is necessary for
effective mediation”).
133
CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.80(b) (West 2013) (“The mediator shall determine prior
to the mediation conference whether the insured will be represented by counsel at the
mediation. The mediator shall inform the insurer whether the insured will be represented by
counsel at the mediation conference. If the insured is represented by counsel at the
mediation conference, the insurer’s counsel may be present. If the insured is not
represented by counsel at the mediation conference, then no counsel may be present.”).
134
While this “repeat player” terminology was originally used by Professor Galanter
in reference to parties in litigation, presumably the same phenomenon could exist in the
mediation context as well. Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead:
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–101 (1974)
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2. Information Exchange
State statutes can also mandate that information be exchanged prior to or
during the mediation session. Rather than leaving parties to exercise discretion
about what information is disclosed in negotiations, legislatures require certain
disclosures. Just as parties must comply with discovery rules when litigating,
requirements to exchange information and documentation can function as “premediation discovery”135 to facilitate informed negotiations. For example, in the
family law context, parents with a child-support dispute may be statutorily required
to exchange affidavits and documentation showing most recent income and assets,
as well as completed child support worksheets, before attending mandatory
mediation.136 Such information exchange enables parties to negotiate in mediation
with the most current information, ensuring that agreements reached are informed
by events on the ground, not what may have been the case months earlier. In some
instances, statutes require both parties to exchange not just documents, but to
obtain outside information. For example, in addition to exchanging documentation,
the law may further require meeting with experts prior to mediation in order to
determine the validity of certain claims or to narrow down what the actual
negotiable issues will be during the mediation session.137
Some statutes may obligate only one of the parties to furnish information. A
complainant might have to provide the other party with notice of the harm alleged
and relief sought so that the responding party can conduct its own investigations in
advance of mediation.138 Requiring a party to provide particular notice of alleged

(noting that litigants who utilize the courts frequently, so-called “repeat players,” as
opposed to “one-shotters,” or claimants who rely on courts only occasionally, have inherent
advantages: having litigated before, they have preexisting systems for court transactions;
they can develop expertise and access specialists easily; they can establish informal
relationships with institutional actors; they are more willing to fight for precedent to
achieve more gains over the long term).
135
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.681 (West 2012).
136
See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 19-A, § 2004 (“The plaintiff and defendant shall exchange,
prior to mediation, affidavits regarding income and assets. These affidavits must conform
with the forms provided by the court and must be accompanied by supporting
documentation of current income, such as pay stubs, tax returns, employer statements or, if
the plaintiff or defendant is self-employed, receipts and expenses . . . . The parties shall
exchange prior to the commencement of mediation a completed child support worksheet.
The worksheet must be completed in accordance with the support guidelines.”).
137
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.55.120(2) (West 2007) (mandating mediation for
construction defects in multi-unit residential buildings and requiring that “[p]rior to the
mediation required by this section, the parties and their experts shall meet and confer in
good faith to attempt to resolve or narrow the scope of the disputed issues, including issues
related to the parties’ repair plans”).
138
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233(2) (West 2012) (mandating mediation of disputes
alleging negligence or violation of resident rights by a nursing home and requiring “[p]rior
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harm and relief sought might help clarify issues in dispute or ensure that claims
lacking legal merit are excluded.139 These requirements are analogous to rules of
civil procedure requiring pleadings to include a claim for relief.140 In contrast, the
burden for generating documentation to demonstrate reasonableness of an alleged
harm also can fall on the responding party. A Vermont law mandating mediation of
disputes over rent increases at mobile home parks requires the park owner to
provide documents and relevant information supporting the proposed rent increase,
giving the park owner “the burden” of showing that the increase is reasonable.141
Collectively, statutory mediation mandates that compel information exchange push
parties to obtain factual support for their positions, an activity that might not
otherwise occur naturally or in the absence of judicial or administrative
intervention.
3. Good-Faith Negotiations
When legislators require parties to negotiate in mediation, they often use
statutes to ensure that the disputing parties take seriously the opportunity to
negotiate. Often this takes the form of good-faith requirements or sometimes,
consequences for mediating in bad faith, both of which are controversial practices
also used by courts to motivate parties to make a sincere effort to resolve their
disputes.142 To compel fair or cooperative behavior in mediation, which occurs

to filing a claim . . . a claimant . . . shall notify each prospective defendant by certified
mail . . . of an asserted violation of a resident’s rights . . . or deviation from the standard of
care. Such notification shall include an identification of the rights . . . violated and the
negligence alleged . . . and a brief description of the injuries sustained by the resident
which are reasonably identifiable at the time of notice.”).
139
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233(2) (West 2012) (“The notice shall contain a
certificate of counsel that counsel’s reasonable investigation gave rise to a good faith belief
that grounds exist for an action against each prospective defendant.”).
140
FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
141
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6252(b) (2011) (“No later than five days before the initial
mediation session, the mobile home park owner shall provide to the mediator and the
leaseholders’ representative all documents and information that the park owner considers
relevant to support the proposed lot rent increase. The mobile home park owner shall have
the burden of providing information to show that proposed lot rent increase is
reasonable.”). See infra notes 241–243 and accompanying text (discussing prescribed
topics for mediation that have a similar effect of creating transparency between the parties).
142
Requirements for good-faith participation in mediation are hotly debated.
Proponents of a good-faith requirement argue that it provides general guidelines for good
conduct, a cause of action for parties on the receiving end of bad behavior, and, if courts
are willing to serve up sanctions against good-faith violators, cooperation from otherwise
uncooperative parties. The good-faith requirement can be broadly construed as a totality of
circumstances surrounding party conduct, see Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant
Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith
Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 627 (2001) (distinguishing
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behind closed doors and out of the public eye, legislators legally obligate parties to
fair dealing. Statutes may either include general good-faith requirements143 or lay
out specific criteria constituting bad faith, such as failure to attend mediation
sessions without cause, failure to provide full information, or participant failure to
have settlement authority in mediation.144
Of course, even when legislation compels meaningful participation in the
mediation, policing behavior still poses a challenge. Some states address this issue
by requiring the mediator to report lapses in good faith observed during mediated
negotiations.145 Others empower the well-behaved party with a new cause of
action: failure to mediate in good faith.146 Legislators also use this downstream
approach by assigning courts the task of ascertaining whether parties appearing in

bad faith from hard bargaining), or as specific, demonstrable conduct such as attending
mediation with settlement authority, following the mediator’s rules, and engaging in
meaningful and direct negotiation discussions. Kimberlee K. Kovach, Good Faith in
Mediation—Requested, Recommended, or Required? A New Ethic, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 575,
622–23 (1997). Opponents argue that good-faith requirements violate mediation
confidentiality and give mediators too much power because the only way to demonstrate
lack of good faith for purposes of obtaining judicial sanctions is from mediator reporting or
testimony. John Lande, Using Dispute System Design Methods to Promote Good-Faith
Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 UCLA L. REV. 69, 102–08
(2002). A further concern is that parties will threaten each other with bad-faith claims as a
strategy for gaining leverage in negotiations. John Lande, Why a Good-Faith Requirement
Is a Bad Idea for Mediation, 23 ALTERNATIVES HIGH COST LITIG. 1, 9 (2005).
143
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1958-B (2005) (“Regardless whether
mediation is sought mutually or unilaterally, both parties shall participate in mediation in
good faith.”).
144
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 583.27(1)(a) (West 2010) (obligating good-faith
participation from parties in farm creditor mediation); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.101(a)
(West 2009) (enumerating behavior constituting bad faith in health insurance mediation).
Both the Texas and Minnesota statutes make sure to clarify, however, that a failure to agree
does not evidence proof of bad faith. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1467.101(b); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 583.27(1)(a).
145
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4634(a), (b)(5) (2015) (requiring the mediator
in a foreclosure action to file a written report outlining the results of the mediation process
and, among other things, identifying whether any party failed to attend the mediation,
participate in good faith, or provide statutorily mandated information); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
583.27(2) (West 2010) (requiring mediator to file an affidavit with parties and with
mediation program director).
146
See, e.g., Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1283 (Nev. 2011) (holding
that the foreclosing party should be sanctioned for failure to bring a required document to
mediation and have a person with settlement authority present at mediation, both of which
were duties required by state statute and supreme court rules); Leyva v. Nat’l Default
Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Nev. 2011) (holding that loan servicer
representative’s failure to bring to mediation required documents showing assignment of
the deed of trust and mortgage note qualified as bad faith under Nevada’s Foreclosure
Mediation Rules and was a “sanctionable” offense).
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a formal hearing made a good-faith effort to settle in mediation.147 Statutes can
empower judges with a variety of sanctions if bad-faith participation in mediation
comes to the attention of the court. Consequences for failing to negotiate in good
faith can result in dismissal of the case or default judgment against the
misbehaving party.148 Parties can suffer monetary punishment, such as
compensating the other party for time and lost wages, covering the full cost of the
mediator, or paying the other party’s attorney’s fees.149 While these statutes do not
constitute a direct mandate on the parties, they can still have a regulatory effect on
behavior, as parties will want to avoid potential sanctions down the road. They also
create potential causes of action for parties that, in turn, become new fulcra that
parties can use as leverage during negotiations.
4. Prescribed Topics for Mediation Discussions
Legislators also direct parties on what—and what not—to discuss in
mediation.150 This prescriptiveness appears, for example, in child-custody disputes
where statutes mandate parties to discuss topics like custody and visitation issues,
but prohibit financial discussions related to child and spousal support.151 In this
type of dispute, appropriate topics for negotiation are distinguished from
inappropriate topics, presumably based on policymakers’ perceptions of relative
imbalances of power between the parties.152 Legislators appear willing to delegate
decision-making authority about residential schedules, health, and education to
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See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6004-A (2014) (mandating landlordtenant mediation and requiring that “[w]hen agreement through mediation is not reached on
an issue, the court shall determine that the parties made a good faith effort to mediate the
issue before proceeding with a hearing”).
148
See, e.g., id. (“If the court finds that either party failed to make a good faith effort
to mediate, the court may order the parties to submit to mediation, may dismiss the action
or a part of the action, may render a decision or judgment by default, may assess attorney’s
fees and costs or may impose any other sanction that is appropriate in the circumstances.”).
149
E.g., id.; see also California’s penalties for parties that fail to appear at insurance
mediation without good cause. CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.81 (West 2013) (stating that the
insurer shall pay the consumer for her actual expenses incurred in attending the conference
plus the value of lost wages, while an insured who fails to appear loses his or her right to
mediate and has to pay all costs charged by the mediator).
150
For example, Texas law requires parties disputing out-of-network insurance
provider payments to discuss the amount charged, whether that amount was customary, as
well as whether and to whom additional costs need to be paid. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §
1467.056 (West 2011).
151
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(b) (2013) (“[C]ontested issue as to the
custody or visitation of a minor child, the matter . . . shall be set for mediation of the
unresolved issues as to custody and visitation . . . . Alimony, child support, and other
economic issues may not be referred for mediation pursuant to this section.”).
152
See Bryan, supra note 88; Grillo, supra note 88; cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser, infra
note 216.

390

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

children’s parents, but reserve the authority to determine family finances for the
state courts.153
Another tactic legislators employ to direct party negotiations is to provide an
exhaustive list of topics for parties to discuss in mediation. In the mortgage
foreclosure mediation context, homeowners and lender representatives154 can be
required by law to talk in mediation about all details relating to the structure of the
loan, payment history, circumstances around the default, as well as all available
alternatives to foreclosure. Vermont’s foreclosure mediation statute enumerates
each foreclosure prevention alternative to be discussed during mediation, from
loan modification to forbearance to short sale; if the foreclosing party refuses to
offer any alternative or to modify the terms of the homeowner loan, then it must
provide justification.155 In Maine, on the other hand, the foreclosing party can also

153

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.1(b)(1)–(5) (2013):

The purposes of mediation . . . include . . . the following goals: (1) To reduce
any acrimony that exists between the parties to a dispute involving custody or
visitation of a minor child; (2) The development of custody and visitation
agreements that are in the child’s best interest; (3) To provide the parties with
informed choices and, where possible, to give the parties the responsibility for
making decisions about child custody and visitation; (4) To provide a structured,
confidential, nonadversarial setting that will facilitate the cooperative resolution
of custody and visitation disputes and minimize the stress and anxiety to which
the parties, and especially the child, are subjected; and (5) To reduce the
relitigation of custody and visitation disputes.
154
This is a simplification—because of the securitization of home mortgages into
investment instruments, most homeowners never mediate with their lenders. For an
expanded explanation of how securitization impacts foreclosure negotiations, see
Nussbaum, supra note 98, at 1893–1908.
155
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4633(a) (2015):

During all mediations under this subchapter:
(1) The parties shall address the available foreclosure prevention tools and, if
disputed, the amount due on the note for the principal, interest, and costs or
fees.
(2) The mortgagee shall use and consider available foreclosure prevention tools,
including reinstatement, loan modification, forbearance, and short sale, and the
applicable government loss mitigation program requirements and any related
“net present value” calculations used in considering a loan modification
conducted under this subchapter.
(3) The mortgagee shall produce for the mortgagor and mediator:
(A) if a modification or other agreement is not offered, an explanation why the
mortgagor was not offered a modification or other agreement; and
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be required, during the mediation itself, to demonstrate the calculations it
conducted, including numeric inputs for the equations used to determine whether
or not foreclosure is in the best interest of the loan investors.156
A statutory mandate does not guarantee compliance; thus, legislators may
require the mediator to keep a record of the topics discussed to ensure parties
actually have the discussions intended under the law. For example, Maryland’s
foreclosure mediation program requires mediators to complete a state-generated
checklist of all potential alternatives to foreclosure, have the parties sign it at the
conclusion of mediation, and then file the signed list with the administrative
agency supervising the program.157 Taken together, these statutes demonstrate that
legislatures not only want parties to mediate specific kinds of disputes, but also
have a particular idea about the appropriate form and content of those mediation
discussions.
5. Mediation as Condition Precedent to Formal Hearing
Legislatures, in the interest of having parties communicate directly with each
other before turning to formal administrative or judicial hearings, often make
mediation a condition precedent to filing a formal complaint with a government

(B) for any applicable government loss mitigation program, the criteria for the
program and the inputs and calculations used in determining the homeowner’s
eligibility for a modification or other program.
156

See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321-A(13) (West 2014):

The mediator’s report must indicate in a manner as determined by the court that
the parties completed in full the Net Present Value Worksheet in the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Loan Modification Program Guide . . . . If the
mediation did not result in the settlement or dismissal of the action, the report
must include the outcomes of the Net Present Value Worksheet . . . . As part of
the report, the mediator may notify the court if, in the mediator’s opinion, either
party failed to negotiate in good faith.
157

MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105.1(1) (West 2008):

(ii) At the commencement of a postfile mediation session, each party shall
review the mediation checklist. (iii) The mediator shall mark each item on the
mediation checklist as the item is addressed at the postfile mediation session.
(iv) At the conclusion of a postfile mediation session, each party shall sign the
mediation checklist.
The checklist used in Maryland can be found at MD. CODE REGS. 09.03.12.10 apps.
OAH-3
to
OAH-4,
http://www.dsd.state.md.us/artwork/090312Appendices.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5GU7-B77V].
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entity.158 These statutes, like South Carolina’s medical malpractice statute, make
clear that parties should sit down and talk about the perceived injury and the
circumstances in which the injury occurred before filing or initiating a civil
action.159 Sometimes the statute transforms mediation into the first step of a formal
complaint, prohibiting a party from proceeding with filing a formal pleading until
the mediation process is completely exhausted.160 Similarly, some statutes blur the
line between formal filing and informal dispute resolution by mandating the
aggrieved party to supply a statement of harm and a request for relief to the
respondent as part of the pre-file mediation process.161
To demonstrate compliance with the law, the party filing the complaint may
have to include a sworn affidavit with its pleading that attests to the fact that the
parties attempted, in good faith, to mediate the issues addressed in the complaint,

158

See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.100(1) (West 2012) (mandating
mediation for all causes of action related to medical malpractice claims by requiring that
“[b]efore a superior court trial, all causes of action, whether based in tort, contract, or
otherwise, for damages arising from injury occurring as a result of health care provided
after July 1, 1993, shall be subject to mandatory mediation prior to trial”); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 8-13.5-104(5) (West 2012) (requiring nursing mothers to mediate disputes
over breastfeeding in the workplace before seeking litigation). Sometimes legislatures only
mandate mediation as a step before the parties can appeal. E.g., TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §
42.226 (West 2011) (“On motion by a party to an appeal under this chapter, the court shall
enter an order requiring the parties to attend mediation. The court may enter an order
requiring the parties to attend mediation on its own motion.”).
159
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-79-125 (2015) (requiring a plaintiff to issue a Notice of
Intent to File Suit, which contains “a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the
party filing the notice is entitled to relief, must be signed by the plaintiff or by his attorney,
and must include any standard interrogatories,” and an affidavit of an expert witness).
160
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 910 (West 2007) (detailing “non-adversarial”
prelitigation procedures for construction defect complaints, which require i) a homeowner
to notify the builder and provide details of the alleged violation, ii) the builder to respond
to the complaint by providing all relevant plans and documentation related to the
construction project, iii) the builder to conduct inspections within a two-week timeframe
and to include with any offers of repair an offer to mediate); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 218.0136
(West 1999) (“A licensee may not file a complaint or petition with the division of hearings
and appeals or bring an action . . . unless the licensee serves a demand for mediation upon
the other licensee before or contemporaneous with the filing of the complaint or petition or
the bringing of the action.”).
161
See supra Part IV.B.2 and accompanying notes, particularly FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
400.011–400.0233 (West 2002). The statutory requirement to mediate, however, does not
identify who must initiate mediation nor does it state explicitly that mediation is a
condition precedent to filing. Indeed, the District Court of Appeals for Florida’s Fifth
District noted the confusion in the statute about whether failure to mediate was a bar to
filing in court. Kissimmee Health Care Assocs. v. Garcia, 76 So. 3d 1107, 1108 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011) (upholding a lower court’s decision denying nursing home operator’s
petition to dismiss the claim from a plaintiff who did not mediate before filing).
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but were unsuccessful.162 Alternatively, the mediator may be required by law to
file a report or mediator’s certificate with the court or administrative agency
certifying that the parties attempted, unsuccessfully, to resolve the issues in good
faith.163 Only subsequently may the parties turn to the court or administrative
agency to resolve their dispute.
6. Incentivizing Settlement
Finally, legislatures influence mediation outcomes by building incentives for
settlement and sometimes directing mediators to make decisions for the parties.
For example, some statutes create economic risk for parties that fail to settle by
borrowing a technique from nonbinding arbitration to encourage settlement.164 One
such statute in Florida involves mandated mediation of complaints against adult
family-care homes, which operate much like foster care, but for adults instead of
children.165 In situations where the parties do not settle, the law requires mediators
to record in a written report the last settlement offer made by the defendant; if the
matter proceeds to trial and the complaining party prevails, but is awarded a
smaller amount in damages, the plaintiff is barred from recovering attorney’s
fees.166 These mediation rules parallel offer-of-judgment rules.167 It seems likely

162

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38.330(1) (LexisNexis 2013) (“Any complaint filed in
such an action must contain a sworn statement indicating that the issues addressed in the
complaint have been mediated pursuant to the provisions of NRS 38.300 to 38.360,
inclusive, but an agreement was not obtained.”). A required affidavit of a good-faith effort
to resolve the dispute parallels the affidavit required in discovery disputes when filing a
motion to compel.
163
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 667-81(a), (b) (LexisNexis 2012) (requiring the thirdparty neutral in informal dispute resolution regarding nonjudicial mortgage foreclosure
actions to file a closing report verifying parties’ attendance and participation and, if no
agreement is reached, that the parties met program requirements; the foreclosing party may
record the mediator’s report and proceed with the foreclosure process). For more
discussion on good faith, see supra Part IV.B.3 and accompanying notes.
164
Jacqueline Nolan-Haley argues that mediation procedures are beginning to look
more like arbitration in that they are increasingly adversarial and rights-based. NolanHaley, supra note 35, at 83–86, 89–91.
165
“Adult family care homes are private residences licensed to provide housing,
meals, and personal care services to elderly and disabled adults who cannot live
independently.” Providers live with the residents they serve. DEP’T OF ELDER AFFAIRS,
STATE OF FLORIDA, Adult Family Care Homes, http://elderaffairs.state.fl.us/doea/afch.php
[https://perma.cc/NG7G-BZWW] (last visited Jan. 19, 2016).
166
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 429.87(2)(b) (West 2014) (“If the parties do not settle the case
pursuant to mediation, the last offer of the defendant made at mediation shall be recorded
by the mediator in a written report that states the amount of the offer, the date the offer was
made in writing, and the date the offer was rejected. If the matter subsequently proceeds to
trial under this section and the plaintiff prevails but is awarded an amount in damages,
exclusive of attorney’s fees, which is equal to or less than the last offer made by the
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that a risk-averse complainant will accept a settlement offer in mediation rather
than proceed with the cost of litigation, face the possibility of a smaller award, and
then not be able to recover the attorney’s fees associated with the continued
litigation. This example demonstrates a situation in which the mediation process,
as constructed by statute, applies special pressure on only one party, the
complainant, to accept settlement offered in mediation rather than risk the
uncertainty of what a judge could decide. The complainant retains the power to
decide whether to accept a settlement offer, but that decision is anchored in a
context of taking or avoiding a financial risk, which exists because the statute
created it.
Sometimes, in incentivizing settlement, legislatures appear to take advantage
of the mediator’s presence as a third party. For example, some statutes require the
mediator to connect parties to assistance programs, directly provide advice and
counsel to the parties, or actively encourage the parties to settle the dispute.168
Rarely, a statute can instruct a mediator to make a decision for the parties in the
event they cannot develop a resolution on their own.169 It remains unclear whether
imbuing the mediator with legal authority to determine a resolution is intended to
be helpful to parties that are truly at a loss for ideas or as a threat to induce parties
to settle themselves (as if the mediator were to say, “if you two cannot make up
your minds then I will decide and you might not like it!”). Many might argue that
these forms of mandatory mediation are, in fact, not mediation at all because they
violate mediation’s core principles of consensus, party autonomy, and mediator
neutrality. It may be that legislators intended the dispute resolution to be a
mediation-arbitration process and mislabeled it “mediation.” On the other hand,
this may just be an articulation of how mediators’ evaluations are beginning to
creep toward the arbitrator’s role.170

defendant at mediation, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any attorney’s fees.” This
applies “only to claims for liability and damages” and not equitable relief. Id. §
429.87(2)(c)).
167
See, e.g., Albert Yoon & Tom Baker, Offer-of-Judgment Rules and Civil
Litigation: An Empirical Study of Automobile Insurance Litigation in the East, 59 VAND.
L. REV. 155, 160–63 (2006).
168
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 2-7-308(b)(1)–(5) (2015) (outlining the
responsibilities of farm-foreclosure mediators and providing that “[a]t the initial mediation
meeting and subsequent meetings, the mediator shall . . . (3) Advise the farmer and creditor
as to the existence of available assistance programs; (4) Encourage the parties to adjust,
refinance, or provide for the payment of the farmer’s debts; and (5) Advise, counsel, and
assist the farmer and creditors in attempting to arrive at an agreement for the future conduct
of financial relations among the parties or to arrive at a settlement which may be stipulated
to in court for the resolution to the court action”).
169
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 8016 (West 2007) (requiring a mediator to issue
decisions in disputes over repatriation of human remains).
170
See Peter Salem, The Emergence of Triage in Family Court Services: The
Beginning of the End for Mandatory Mediation?, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 371, 378 (2009).
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By obligating parties to mediate and then regulating parties’ conduct through
mandates or sanctions, lawmakers directly influence the mediation process and, as
a consequence, its outcomes. Why, then, is a process like mediation, classically
characterized by informality and a lack of prefabricated structure, being deployed
in such a structured, rule-based way to resolve disputes? The remainder of this
Article presents one possible explanation for this phenomenon and explores
considerations for policymakers and mediation advocates when issuing these
mediation mandates.
V. MEDIATION, REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE
Classical mediation’s lack of formality and capacity to empower private
parties drove its early institutionalization in courts and administrative agencies.
Lawmakers’ latest application of mediation, however, recasts mediation as a
regulatory tool.171 When substantive statutes include embedded mediation
mandates or when statutes exert both formal and informal control over parties’
behavior in mediation, the effect is regulation of parties’ dispute processing.
Mediation therefore shifts from an opportunity for private ordering into a
mechanism by which disputes and disputants are governed by state intervention.
These statutes should be characterized as “regulation” because it offers a more
accurate description of the power dynamic between the state and its citizens than
the public-private, formal-informal dichotomies that have long dominated
discussions of ADR.
Yet why would lawmakers choose to embed mediation requirements into new
legislation? Even more puzzling, why alter the traditional boundaries between
public and private dispute resolution by selecting an informal process like
mediation and then adding legal obligations that control parties’ behavior?
Unfortunately, for many of these statutes, evidence of clear legislative intent to
answer these questions proves elusive.172

171

Regulation, like mediation, faces a definitional challenge because it takes on
different meanings in different contexts. For example, legal scholars perceive regulation as
an instrument of administrative law, sociologists and criminologists cast regulation as a
form of social control, economists consider regulation a strategic tool for shaping market
behavior, scholars of public administration define regulation as the scope of state authority,
and scholars of global governance see regulation as international standards and soft norms.
David Levi-Faur, Regulation and Regulatory Governance, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS
OF REGULATION 3, 3–4 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011) [hereinafter Levi-Faur, Regulation and
Regulatory Governance].
172
Many question whether a body of legislators can have a single-minded intent and
many also debate which materials indicate intent (statutory language, legislative history,
testimony, statements from key legislators, press releases, etc.). For a useful discussion and
review of the literature, see Richard I. Nunez, The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use
of Legislative Documents as Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Interpretation: A Reexamination, 9
CAL. W. L. REV. 128, 128–35 (1972).
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One possible explanation emerges by applying regulatory-governance theory.
Regulatory governance is an interdisciplinary field that studies the interdependent
relationship between governments and the governed.173 This governance
relationship has taken different forms throughout history. One form of regulatory
governance, decentralized governance, constructs procedures that shift the power
to regulate from the state to civil society in an effort to promote efficiency and
render regulation more democratic, breaking down traditional lines between public
and private spheres of authority.174
Decentralized governance and the idea of using procedure to shift power from
the state to civil society mirrors what is happening in the dispute resolution
context. Statutory mediation mandates relocate authority over dispute resolution
from the state to private parties, creating opportunities for disputants to negotiate
directly and resolve their conflicts without state adjudication yet within procedural
parameters laid down by the state. Indeed, formalizing mediation procedure in
statute can be understood as the state’s effort to build procedural architecture for
decentralized dispute processing. This Part first explains why mediation mandates
should be defined as regulation; then briefly sets out different theoretical models of
state regulatory governance; and then argues that one governance paradigm in
particular—decentralized governance—offers the best model for understanding
this new frontier in mediation’s institutionalization.
A. Reframing Mediation Mandates as Regulation
One can characterize mediation as “regulation” in a number of different ways.
As discussed in the previous Part, legislatures deploy a range of mediation
mandates that impose different kinds of requirements on private actors. Similarly,
there are different ways to define regulation, the three most common of which
range from more to less directive. Regulation can be i) a “specific set of
commands,” or binding, legal rules backed by sanctions; ii) “deliberate state
influence” over economic and social behavior (this category includes economic
incentives like taxes or subsidies, deployment of resources, and supply of

173

Or, more precisely, regulatory governance explores the formal and informal
controls that government exerts over private actors through government (in)actions, which
in turn are influenced by the regulated entities themselves. Levi-Faur, Regulation and
Regulatory Governance, supra note 171, at xvi. “Thus governance, defined as any strategy,
process, procedure, or program for controlling, regulating, or exercising authority over
either animate or inanimate objects or populations, is regarded as being much broader than
the traditional conception of state-centred regulation.” Peter Swan, Governing at a
Distance: An Introduction to Law, Regulation, and Governance, in LAW, REGULATION,
AND GOVERNANCE 1, 11 (Michael Mac Neil, Neil Sargent & Peter Swan eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Swan, Governing at a Distance].
174
See sources cited infra note 197.
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information to the public); and iii) “all forms of social and economic influence,”
whether state-based or private, deliberate or incidental.175
Mediation mandates should be thought of as regulation under each of these
three definitions. For example, when legislatures mandate mediation and include
sanctions for, or causes of action against, parties that do not cooperate,176 they
regulate parties’ dispute resolution processing according to the first, most directive
idea of state regulation. The state commands parties to mediate by issuing binding,
legal rules and lays out punishments should the command not be followed.
Legislatures’ use of mediation mandates also constitute regulation according to the
second definition, which identifies regulation as deliberate influence over
socioeconomic behavior. For example, when legislatures predicate recovery of
attorneys’ fees on settlement offers made in mediation or require public institutions
to make mediation a mandatory first step, thereby lengthening administrative
procedures,177 legislatures create economic incentives for parties to negotiate rather
than invest the financial resources required for litigation. And finally, statutes
mandating mediation also fit the third, least directive concept of regulation.
Embedding mediation into substantive statutes surely influences how disputing
parties engage the question of how to resolve their differences.178 These statutes

175

ROBERT BALDWIN, MARTIN CAVE & MARTIN LODGE, UNDERSTANDING
REGULATION: THEORY, STRATEGY, AND PRACTICE 3 (2d ed. 2012). See also Julia Black,
Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1 (2002) (cataloguing
different conceptions of regulation and explaining a decentered understanding of
regulation); BARRY M. MITNICK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: CREATING,
DESIGNING, AND REMOVING REGULATORY FORMS 2–20 (1980) (defining regulation as “the
intentional restriction of a subject’s choice of activity by an entity not directly party to or
involved in that activity”); ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC
THEORY 1–5 (1994) (defining regulation narrowly, as a politico-economic concept, with
three key characteristics—directive (individuals are compelled by higher state authority),
inhabiting public law, and centralized state power); Susan S. Silbey, Organizational
Challenges to Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: A New Common Sense About
Regulation, 649 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 7 (2013) (noting that government
regulation is a way to “describe macroeconomic processes,” as well as a way to describe
“the relationship between law and its consequences” (the “difference between law-on-thebooks and law-in-action”); regulation is the “instrumentality of law” to organize social
relations and produce “particular desired conditions”).
176
See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 667-82 (LexisNexis 2012) (imposing sanctions
for a party failing to comply with foreclosure mediation requirements including a $1,500
fine and, for homeowners, lifting the stay of foreclosure, and for mortgagees, imposing a
stay of foreclosure).
177
See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.05(F) (LexisNexis 2013) (requiring the
state board of education to create an opportunity for parents to mediate disputes involving
any matter).
178
See generally Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 44 (discussing the “modern
evolution” of how different ADR processes are used in the corporate environment and
analyzing parties’ changing perceptions about ADR).
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promote consensus-based dispute resolution as a new norm and send a message to
parties that they should attempt to work out their dispute themselves rather than
reflexively turning to formal adjudication with public institutions.
Thus, mediation statutes constitute regulation under each definition, in some
cases as direct state control with enforcement mechanisms and in other cases as
indirect activity that influences citizens’ behavior or creates new societal norms.
Having established that mediation mandates fit the different definitions of
regulation, one can then assess different theories of regulation, or how states use
regulation to govern to further certain policy objectives.
B. Theories of Regulatory Governance: Liberal Versus Interventionist
Historically, governments had different policy objectives and executed their
regulatory duties differently; as a consequence, different themes or models of
regulatory governance have emerged. At the beginning of the twentieth century,
North American and Western European states changed how they used law to
govern society.179 States moved away from the paradigm of classical liberalism,
which uses law to protect private individuals’ security and freedom by containing
the power of a potentially dangerous state,180 toward an interventionist theory of
state governance.181 Under a liberal model of governance, laws established
negative liberties that placed limits on the state’s ability to interfere with private
individuals’ positive rights to contract freely and own property. This is because the
bourgeoisie of the nineteenth century wanted the same access to, and freedom in,
economic markets that the ruling class and political elites enjoyed.182
However, influenced by world war and the rise of mass politics, legal
theorists argued for an interventionist state that would provide a “social safety net”
guaranteeing minimal living conditions and security for economically weak
members of society.183 This idea, strengthening public law to fix social

179

Not coincidentally, during this same period of time in the United States, called the
Progressive Era, Roscoe Pound and other legal reformers were calling for changes to the
American legal landscape to improve citizens’ access to justice. Pound, supra note 59.
180
Jürgen Habermas, Paradigms of Law, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 771, 772–73 (1996).
In discussing why law holds private individuals liable for certain kinds of tort instead of
public payout for damages, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. wrote in The Common Law that
state machinery “ought not to be set in motion unless some clear benefit is to be derived
from disturbing the status quo. State interference is an evil, where it cannot be shown to be
a good.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881).
181
Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 4.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 2–4 (citing 2 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF
INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 641, 880–89 (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds., 1978)). Specifically, in
the United States, legal realists like Robert Lee Hale argued that “corrective legislation”
like public works, government enterprises, and deficit financing would combat the excesses
of laissez-faire capitalism and equalize bargaining power between the economically
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inequalities, profoundly impacted American public policy, from Roosevelt’s New
Deal184 to Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society,185 and led to a vast expansion in
regulatory agencies and rules.186 This fifty-year period in American history
included reforms to the banking system, Social Security, housing, food safety, and
labor and employment, to name a few.187
In the 1970s the interventionist model of state governance and its concomitant
regulatory bureaucracy came under attack, criticized from all sides of the political
spectrum for ineffectiveness and inefficiency.188 Neoliberals called for

powerful and less powerful without jeopardizing economic liberty. Robert L. Hale,
Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 606, 626–28 (1943).
184
Trevor Purvis, Regulation, Governance, and the State: Reflections on the
Transformation of Regulatory Practices in Late-Modern Liberal Democracies, in LAW,
REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 173, at 28, 34–37 [hereinafter Purvis,
Regulation, Governance, and the State]; Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at
7.
185
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 18–32 (1990).
186
From 1936 to 1977, the number of pages of federal regulations grew from 2,599 to
65,603, tripling during the 1970s. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 1
(1982). The Federal Register reports that in 2013 the Code of Federal Regulations consists
of 166,352 pages, excluding indices and compiled Title 3 documents. OFFICE OF THE FED.
REGISTER, C.F.R. PAGE BREAKDOWN – 1975 THROUGH 2013, chart 13 (2014),
https://www.federalregister.gov/uploads/2014/04/CFR-Actual-Pages-published1-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4SQP-ZJ2A].
187
SUNSTEIN, supra note 185.
188
BREYER, supra note 186, at 2–3; Purvis, Regulation, Governance, and the State,
supra note 184, at 37–38. A primary argument leveled at state regulation was that the
government’s regulatory apparatus had been captured, or co-opted, by the same industries
it was supposed to monitor and therefore, could no longer regulate in the best interest of the
public. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.
SCI. 3–4 (1971). Another argument was that regulation was fundamentally undemocratic:
regulation was the work of administrative agencies, housed in the executive branch and run
by appointed, unelected bureaucrats wielding tremendous power and engaging in
unchecked “empire building” not necessarily aligned with the public’s interest. Critics also
argued that even if the state were focused on advancing the public’s interest, it simply
lacked the capacity to manage and respond effectively to an increasingly complex, fastpaced, interconnected, and multicultural world. In addition to a lack of accountability and
ineffectiveness, scholars argued that the money raised by taxes to fund the state’s
expansive regulatory apparatus sucked capital from businesses and individuals and the
unpredictability of the regulatory process itself served as a disincentive to investment and
productivity; thus, they advocated a return to classical liberal, laissez-faire, free markets.
Furthermore, critics of state-sponsored social welfare programs (health care, education,
social security, housing, employment, etc.) suggested that the safety net caused more harm
than good because it led to perpetual reliance on the state by discouraging individuals from
looking after themselves. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY
141–43 (1973); SUNSTEIN, supra note 185, at 74–100; IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
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deregulation, or government withdrawal from the economic sphere, and a return to
regulatory governance modeled after classical liberal laissez-faire principles.189
Others called for reforms to the regulatory system, one program at a time, to fix
failures and make sure that state intervention indeed met its goal of advancing
social welfare.190 Out of this debate emerged a third paradigm for regulatory
governance: decentralized regulatory governance. This new theory of governance
recalibrates the power dynamic between the state and private individuals and
provides the best explanation for the rise in statutory mediation mandates.
C. A New Theory: Decentralized Regulatory Governance
Decentralized governance, a third theory of regulatory governance, explains
why states would use mediation mandates to transfer dispute resolution authority
from public adjudicative institutions, like the courts, to private disputants.
Decentralized governance theory appears to balance the liberal state’s values of
liberty and autonomy with the interventionist state’s values of equity and social
welfare.191 Under the paradigm of decentralized governance (which elsewhere has
been called many things, including reflexive or responsive regulation,192

RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 159–61 (Donald
R. Harris et al. eds., 1992).
189
The “Chicago School” comprised the chief architects of “economic theory of
regulation,” which presented economic arguments for deregulation and a return to classical
liberal laissez-faire markets. One component of their argument, the “public choice theory,”
argued that a regulated market economy is not appropriately competitive and transparent,
operating instead to the benefit of government officials; thus, regulation does not give
market actors, consumers and producers a real choice about how and whether to engage in
market transactions. See Stigler, supra note 188, at 3; Richard A. Posner, Theories of
Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 339 (1974); Sam Peltzman et
al., An Economic Theory of Regulation After a Decade of Deregulation,
MICROECONOMICS, 1989, at 1, 53–56 (1989).
190
See generally BREYER, supra note 186, at 341–68 (discussing approaches to
regulatory reform).
191
Whether the regulatory state is in retreat or whether it has shifted to a new, third
paradigm is a topic of debate among scholars, further compounded by different
governments’ reactions to the “Great Recession” of 2008. This Article does not attempt to
resolve this debate (although the statistics from the Federal Register are certainly a
persuasive argument that deregulation is not occurring, see C.F.R., supra note 186), but
instead focus on the model of decentralized regulation in which the state shapes and
manipulates while preserving individual choice. See Purvis, Regulation, Governance, and
the State, supra note 184, at 37–43; see generally John W. Cioffi, After the Fall:
Regulatory Lessons from the Global Financial Crisis, in HANDBOOK ON THE POLITICS OF
REGULATION 642 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011) (discussing regulation after the 2007–09
financial crisis).
192
AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 188, at 4–5 (asserting that government
regulation should not completely displace the market; involving industry in regulation
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procedural regulation,193 decentralized regulation,194 or libertarian paternalism195)
the entity being regulated is considered to have valuable knowledge or decisionmaking capacity that, in some instances, has greater legitimacy than the state’s
knowledge base or decision-making capacity.
Decentralized governance operates by replacing the paternalistic
interventionism of the welfare state with procedures that allow for party autonomy,
self-regulation, and greater participation in the regulatory process.196 Rather than
issuing demands, the state uses law to transfer responsibility for crafting and
implementing those demands to other systems within civil society, such as local
communities, private-sector industries, trade associations, or professional
organizations.197 “Laws, therefore, do not specify the substantive ends to be
achieved but rather encourage the informational and governance capacities of
organizations,” yet without abdicating the goal of regulating in the interests of the
common good.198 Through procedures like deliberative democracy, a process for
inclusive group decision making, regulated entities can inform regulation. In

allows for a more tailored response by government). See generally PHILIPPE NONET &
PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 73–113
(1978).
193
Habermas, supra note 180, at 776–80 (identifying a third, proceduralist paradigm
in law that is distinct from classical liberalism and the interventionist social welfare state in
that administrative procedures exist to “steer” individuals while still allowing individual
autonomy).
194
See Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG. PHIL. 1, 2–
10 (2002).
195
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1161–62 (2003) [hereinafter Sunstein & Thaler,
Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron] (considering libertarian paternalism as a
means of influencing behavior while respecting free choice, or “self-conscious efforts, by
private and public institutions, to steer people’s choices in directions that will improve the
choosers’ own welfare”); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83 (rev. and expanded ed., 2009)
[hereinafter THALER & SUNSTEIN, NUDGE] (presenting a variety of examples and
recommendations for “choice architecture,” structuring law and public policy using
libertarian paternalism to improve health, schools, retirement saving, etc.).
196
See Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 11–14 (“[R]ecent
approaches emphasize a ‘decentring’ of a state that is but one of a plurality of sites of
governance and regulation.”).
197
See Alan Hunt, Legal Governance and Social Relations: Empowering Agents and
the Limits of Law, in LAW, REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE, supra note 173, at 55, 61;
Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 8–9; Black, supra note 194, at 1, 15–20.
Many use self-regulating professions like the legal profession as an example of
decentralized regulation. See also Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, in MICHEL
FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS, 208–26 (Hubert L. Dreyfus &
Paul Rabinow eds., 2d ed., 1982) (describing the relationship between individual choice
and state control with theories of “responsibilization” and “governmentality”).
198
Swan, Governing at a Distance, supra note 173, at 14.

402

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

theory, delegating regulatory tasks to non-state actors can allow regulation to
become customized and responsive to the circumstances of different groups.199
And, government can empower private entities to police one another. Consider, for
example, delegating the state’s watchdog or enforcement powers to public interest
groups, like the Sierra Club or National Wildlife Federation, by enacting a statute
that gives them legal standing to bring a lawsuit against an environmental
polluter.200
It is important to note that while decentralized governance theory conceives of
state regulation as procedural rather than interventionist, the social-equity
objectives remain. Under this theory, the state should use law to empower
individuals, powerful and marginalized alike, to take responsibility for, and
improve, some aspect of their own condition, like health or employment.201 To
create this shift in responsibility, state policymakers and deputized private entities
employ legal and extralegal incentives, such as default rules for retirement savings,
comparative negligence regimes, or reduced home insurance premiums for
installing security systems.202 Individuals exercise choice and take responsibility
for those choices, but do so in a closed universe, steered or “nudged” in directions
that improve their own welfare.203 Thus, policymakers increasingly become
“choice architects”204 and facilitators, overseeing legal regimes that create
processes in which social and economic actors retain individual choice, but do so
in furtherance of the public good.205
The theory of decentralized governance provides a helpful model to explain
the institutionalization of mediation and the multi-dimensional relationship

199
As the theory goes, delegating government intervention to private actors allows the
government to harmonize its public-interest regulatory goals more closely with laissez-faire
market efficiency. But this does not mean that industry gets to make up its own rules to the
game and also be the referee. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 188, at 158–62.
200
Id.
201
Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note 195,
at 1167–70 (2003) (indicating that people often make choices against their own selfinterest, not because they are exercising true preferences based on rational deliberation (as
homo economicus might), but because of influences, both subtle and overt, that have been
studied and demonstrated by behavioral economists).
202
Hunt, supra note 197, at 63.
203
See Sunstein & Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, supra note
195, at 1162–63, 1196–1201. It is worth pointing out that Thaler and Sunstein, while
arguing for individual autonomy and choice, do not suggest that individuals know what is
best for themselves. Using findings from behavioral economics, Thaler and Sunstein
demonstrate that individual decision makers are highly susceptible to suggestion and
frequently make irrational decisions against their self-interest. Choice architecture exploits
this human tendency by deliberately building choice intersections, or points at which
someone can choose one fork in the road over another, to influence people to make a
choice that does serve their best interests. Id.
204
Id. at 1161.
205
Hunt, supra note 197, at 68 (citation omitted).
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between public and private power. Perhaps not coincidentally, the judicial reform
movement that led to the institutionalization of mediation in American courts and
administrative agencies206 occurred at the same time that the interventionist model
of regulatory governance faced criticism in the 1970s. Just as judicial reform
advocates sought to use ADR procedures like mediation to empower disputants
and provide efficient access to justice, regulatory reforms redesigned regulatory
procedure to reinsert autonomy and individual choice into the federal
government’s regulatory apparatus.
Thus, statutory mediation mandates should be viewed as decentralized
governance, or state regulation that constructs procedural architecture to advance
the general public’s welfare. Rather than state institutions maintaining a monopoly
on dispute resolution through adjudication in judicial and administrative contexts,
the state sends parties through a mediation process instead of prescribing an
outcome. Laws requiring disputing parties to mediate exemplify the trend toward
“‘proceduralism’; law is less directed to supply rules for decision than it is to
introduce procedures through which substantive decisions may be reached.”207
Disputing parties negotiate directly, assess the nature of the harm suffered and the
responsibility owed, and ultimately develop their own resolution.208 The state
requires parties to negotiate and allows them to retain a degree of choice and
autonomy within the mediation process. Parties can still determine mediation
outcomes: whether to agree or not to agree, and according to what terms.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATURES DESIGNING DECENTRALIZED
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Using mediation as a decentralized regulatory vehicle is neither categorically
“good” nor categorically “bad.” Rather, formalizing certain components of the
mediation process can provide benefits or impose unfair burdens on parties. In
some situations, requiring disputants to attempt private resolution through
mediation provides a benefit by forcing early, direct communication in a
moderated environment. Yet while a highly structured, rule-based mediation
process can neutralize power imbalances for some parties, formalizing mediation
can also create leverage that elevates one side’s negotiation power over the other.
Thus, decisions about which elements of the mediation process to formalize should
be made carefully.
The following sections take a critical look at the effect of certain elements of
mediation statutes on the parties themselves. It then proposes recommendations for
how legislatures can design procedural architecture that maximizes the potential
benefits of mediation and minimizes the potential harms.

206

See supra Part III.A.
These echoes of Lon Fuller are found in Hunt, supra note 197, at 58.
208
See supra Part II.
207
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A. How to Build Efficiency and Equity into the Process
Relocating dispute resolution authority from state actors to private individuals
has the potential to yield benefits for the disputing parties. Disputants who
negotiate directly in mediation may resolve their differences with reduced costs,
greater efficiency, and more tailored remedies than the state can provide—the very
“production” and “quality” arguments that first fueled mediation’s
institutionalization.209 The notion that parties can be empowered to resolve their
differences on their own, without state intervention, is rhetorically compelling.
However, rather than “surrendering conflict to existing power
constellations,”210 legislators should design mediation architecture that promotes a
fair process and, as a consequence, advances just outcomes. Individuals with
limited economic, social, or cultural capital, who may be vulnerable in negotiations
with “repeat players,”211 can benefit when legislatures include certain requirements
in their statutory mandates. For example, as this section discusses, requiring
mediation participants to have settlement authority, specifying what information to
exchange, and prescribing topics for discussion can help parties reach more fully
informed, consensus-based resolutions than they might otherwise.
It may seem paradoxical that in order to ensure that an informal process like
mediation does not compromise social justice (a concern also raised when
mediation was first institutionalized),212 some parts of the mediation process must
become formalized. Yet formalizing the mediation process will be necessary if
states continue to embed mediation mandates into substantive law because states
have an ethical responsibility to design dispute resolution processes that promote,
rather than undermine, fairness.213
1. Require Settlement Authority
A statute requiring parties with decision-making authority to attend mediation
exemplifies the kind of libertarian paternalist choice architecture that promotes fair
and efficient negotiations. The statute preserves parties’ liberty to choose whether
and how to settle the dispute, a defining characteristic of classical mediation, but
makes resolution possible by mandating settlement authority as a foundational
legal requirement of parties in mediation. This requirement can prove particularly

209

See supra Part III.B.
GUNTHER TEUBNER, Juridification—Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR,
CORPORATE, ANTITRUST, AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 3, 8 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987).
211
Galanter, supra note 134, at 97.
212
See generally Grillo, supra note 88, at 1555–61; Delgado et al., supra note 88, at
1361–67; Bryan, supra note 88, at 446–81.
213
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Are There Systemic Ethics Issues in Dispute System
Design? And What We Should [Not] Do About It: Lessons from International and
Domestic Fronts, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 195, 211–19 (2009).
210
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useful when one party is an individual and the other an organization, as is often the
case for consumer and corporate disputes.
2. Establish Rules for Information Exchange
Similarly, legislatures can effectuate informed and efficient negotiations by
prescribing discussion topics and identifying what information to exchange prior to
or during mediation. Parties can know in advance the agenda for the mediation and
come prepared. It also can have the effect of correcting imbalances of power
between the parties and forcing a party that has more information—or that may be
unlikely to cooperate—to cover in depth all the topics the less informed or less
empowered party wants to cover. Mandating information exchange and prescribing
topics for discussion may protect a less experienced or sophisticated party,
especially one without legal representation, and help make mediation discussions
more informed without significantly burdening the other party. This requirement
can also help to protect the mediator’s neutrality by assigning responsibility for
producing information to the parties so that the mediator’s role does not become
that of inquisitor.
3. Acknowledge Imbalances of Power and Make Informational Support Available
Legislators cannot assume parties will be equally matched in mediation and
therefore need to consider ways to empower weaker parties.214 It seems impossible
to imagine how a statute could correct for every potential imbalance of power,
which can be highly contextual and may include differences in language ability,
legal knowledge, financial resources, time, and prior experience. However, if
parties in mediation are expected to police each other in a reciprocal manner, all
parties need to be able to advocate for their interests and understand the other
party’s motivations.215 One recommendation is to give the less sophisticated party,
for example a homeowner approaching foreclosure mediation with the investor
representative, access to information or professional assistance before attending
mediation.216 Some foreclosure mediation programs require parties to meet with a

214

Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative Judicial
Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 25–26 (1999) (“To
put it simply, the “Haves” come out ahead by being able to choose and manipulate what
process will be used to enforce substantive rights.”). While requiring mediation may
remove powerful parties’ ability to choose a dispute process favorable to them, mediation
may well be their process of choice.
215
Lon Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 361–62
(1978) (“[I]n a relation of reciprocity each party is expected to stand up for himself . . .
however, we must know, if we are to obtain what we want, what the other fellow wants.”).
216
Attorneys can be useful to parties negotiating “in the shadow of the law” by
helping parties figure out their real interests, explaining applicable legal norms, and, if the
case were to continue to litigation, probable outcomes. Yet, attorneys can also frustrate
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housing counselor or attorney in a brief advice session prior to mediation.217 Other
jurisdictions train and sponsor volunteer attorneys who can provide limited
representation in mediation.218
If, after considering potential power imbalances, legislatures cannot provide
adequate support for vulnerable parties, then perhaps an altogether different
dispute resolution process should be selected. Mediation is predicated on the
theory that parties craft and choose their own settlement terms; if policymakers
have concerns about those choices in situations where parties are unequally
matched, then mediation may not be the right process choice. Other processes in
which a third party analyzes parties’ legal rights and responsibilities, such as
nonbinding arbitration or early neutral evaluation by an experienced attorney,
would be a better fit.
B. How to Avoid Adverse Consequences of Formalization
Despite the potential benefits of further institutionalizing mediation, there are
potential risks both from embedding mandatory mediation into individual statutory
regimes and formalizing certain aspects of the mediation process. Formalizing
mediation with legal mandates adds procedural complexity to dispute resolution—
complexity that can sometimes burden the parties and frustrate the state’s effort to
help parties become more actively engaged in resolving their disputes. Some
legislatures’ statutory directives may generate confusion about the mediation
process, spur new and unintended causes of action, or serve as barriers for injured
parties seeking redress.
Further, for these statutes, as forms of decentralized governance, to effectuate
their intended social benefit, parties must be incentivized to participate and also be
able to police each other. Yet legislatures have used mediation to regulate disputes,
particularly those between businesses and individual consumers, where parties are

private negotiations by relying too heavily on legal rules and precedents. Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 985–88 (1979).
217
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 61.24.031, .160, .163 (West 2004 & Supp. 2015)
(requiring the foreclosing party to contact homeowners; provide information about housing
counselors, attorneys, and mediation; and inform the homeowner that failure to meet with a
housing counselor to discuss alternatives to foreclosure may forfeit the opportunity to
mediate).
218
See, e.g., Foreclosure Prevention Pro Bono Project, PRO BONO RESOURCE
CENTER OF MARYLAND, http://probonomd.org/about-us/about-foreclosure-prevention
[https://perma.cc/J6LW-W8GM] (last visited Jan. 19, 2016) (providing free training,
malpractice insurance, and mentoring support for attorneys who volunteer to provide
limited representation to homeowners in foreclosure). This approach would require
adjustments to the jurisdiction’s Rules of Professional Conduct to enable attorneys to
provide assistance in a limited capacity without fear of client conflicts. See MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 6.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
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not evenly matched in sophistication or negotiation power and therefore cannot
effectively police each other. Legislatures must keep consumer protection in mind
when considering a decentralized, procedural regulation like mediation and may
find that for disputes of particular concern to the public, a more interventionist
approach to regulation may prove a better policy choice.
1. Aim for Procedural Uniformity and Predictability
Proliferating statutes containing bespoke mediation procedure can create
problems if it becomes too difficult for parties to know what to expect of the
mediation process and, in turn, what is expected of them.219 When legislatures
construct different dispute resolution procedures that are all called “mediation,”
each with particularized legal rights and responsibilities based on the type of
dispute, legislators do a disservice if the public (and the legal community) does not
know what to expect from a legally mandated dispute resolution process. For
example, in some statutes, the mediator may be required to assess parties’ goodfaith participation, issue sanctions if certain documents are not provided, or make
decisions about how unresolved issues should be settled, while other statutes
prohibit such behavior from the mediator. If legislators seek to impose some
element of consistency, one approach is adopting the Uniform Mediation Act
(“UMA”) and having it govern all statutory mediation requirements, as Illinois
does.220 Indeed, one of the motivations for developing the UMA was to promote
uniformity and consistency of mediation practice throughout a single
jurisdiction.221 Or a state could develop its own mediation statute to establish what
the mediator’s role and conduct will be and what parties can expect with respect to
confidentiality.222

219

This concern echoes the calls for transsubstantive procedure, or a procedure that is
uniform across case types, which propelled the writing and passage of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Whether uniformity has served the interests of civil justice remains a
contested issue, eight decades later. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive
Procedures, supra note 97, at 391 (“Since . . . procedural decisions can, and often do,
materially influence substantive application, the rules cannot provide a uniformity of
result.”); Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U.
L. REV. 801, 840 (2010) (“[E]fforts to harmonize or approximate procedural
systems . . . are championed with promises of efficiency, simplicity, and uniformity.”).
220
See 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/32 (West 2009 & Supp. 2015) (requiring all
mediations under this section to be governed by the Uniform Mediation Act).
221
See Prefatory Note to the UNIF. MEDIATION ACT, supra note 12 (discussing the
guiding principles behind the UMA). To date, the UMA has been adopted in eleven states
(Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,
and Washington) and the District of Columbia. Legislative Fact Sheet — Mediation Act,
UNIF. L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=
Mediation%20Act [https://perma.cc/4YWC-BV9D] (last visited Mar. 22, 2016).
222
See, e.g., Mediation Confidentiality Act, MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 31801(b), (d)(1)–(2) (LexisNexis 2013) (defining “mediation” as a process of working with

408

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 2

Then again, there may be perfectly good reasons to vary construction of
mediation processes if those adaptations make the process better suited for a type
of dispute or set of disputants. Ideally, legislatures are aware of these different
variations and make informed decisions about which architectural design choices
to make, for example to improve communication rather than spread confusion. It
may be unrealistic, however, for legislators to have expertise in both the
substantive nature of a dispute as well as the technicalities of mediation procedural
design. Some states have therefore established stand-alone mediation and dispute
resolution agencies that provide mediation expertise to the state. These agencies
are charged with promulgating rules for mediating specific disputes and providing
a range of subject-specific mediation services.223
2. Avoid Creating New Causes of Action, Especially When Parties’ Negotiation
Power Is Likely Mismatched
One important consequence of a decentralized, procedural approach to
regulation is that, ironically, more procedure leads to more, rather than less, law by
spawning new legal rights and responsibilities.224 What once were informal
processes, like negotiation, now become more formalized and solidified in law.
Formalizing mediation with new substantive legal obligations, such as
requirements for informal pleading,225 good-faith participation,226 and prescribed
topics for mediation discussions,227 also means potential new causes of action if

impartial mediators to reach a voluntary agreement and “mediator” as a person who
“[a]ssists parties in reaching their own voluntary agreement” and who adheres to the
Maryland Standard of Conduct for Mediators). Maryland does not achieve complete,
statewide consistency because the statute does carve out a variety of exceptions for certain
types of mediations, such as foreclosure and some court-connected mediation programs.
See id. § 3-1802(b).
223
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3600 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.)
(establishing the California State Mediation and Conciliation Service); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:13A-4 (West 2011) (establishing the State Board of Mediation in the Department of
Labor).
224
This phenomenon is also called “juridification.” See generally Teubner, supra note
210. A second consequence is the blurring of lines between public and private spheres—
state compelled mediation occupies both of these. Purvis, Regulation, Governance, and the
State, supra note 184, at 42; see also Hunt, supra note 197, at 58 (“[M]any organizations
replace informal means of dispute resolution by formalized law-like systems of rules and
procedures.”).
225
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0233 (2) (West 2012) (requiring mediation before
a resident of a nursing home can file suit for negligence); discussion supra Part IV.B.5.
226
See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1958-B(1) (West 2005) (requiring dispute
resolution in agricultural marketing and bargaining); discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
227
See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4633 (West, Westlaw through 2015–2016 First
Sess.) (requiring mediation in foreclosure proceedings); discussion supra Part IV.B.4.
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those obligations go unmet. A number of consequences flow from hyperlegalizing
mediation, and legislators should proceed with caution.
First, by creating new causes of action and making litigation more complex,
legislators may inadvertently frustrate their efforts to relocate dispute resolution
within civil society. If one reason for legislatures’ decision to embed mediation
requirements into statutes is to reduce state involvement in dispute resolution and
to make dispute processing more accessible, codifying the mediation process
frustrates that goal by creating two, three, sometimes four additional issues,
unrelated to the original substantive claim, for parties to fight about in court.228
Consequently, not only are causes of action multiplied by formalizing mediated
negotiations, any subsequent litigation is also rendered more complex. This has
additional significance if only one of the parties has financial resources or capacity
to sustain prolonged, complex court litigation after failed negotiations. Thus,
inserting legal requirements into the mediation process can increase, rather than
decrease, the time and money ultimately spent litigating in the courts and may give
powerful parties an unfair advantage.
Second, while new causes of action created by formalizing mediation
exemplify decentralized regulatory governance because they deputize private
parties to police each other, problems arise when the parties are unequally
matched. Some mediation statutes deliberately create causes of action to encourage
cooperative negotiation behavior and deter uncooperative negotiation behavior.
For example, if a party fails to produce the required documents listed in the statute,
the other party can, theoretically, turn to the courts to report the bad behavior and
seek a remedy like enforcement of the document production or sanctions.229 In
theory, knowing that the well-behaved party has this power should incentivize
good behavior from a potential misbehaver. Behavioral checks-and-balances can
work if the parties are equally matched in financial capacity and legal
sophistication. But in reality that is not always the case. Inserting a cause of action
into a mediation between unequal parties, for example a large business and an
individual, non-corporate consumer, can doubly work against the less powerful
party—the less powerful party will not be able to provide an adequate check on the
more powerful party and, knowing its behavior goes unchecked, the more powerful
party may be more inclined to misbehave.
This is especially true when legislators build in a good-faith requirement to a
statutory mediation process. It may seem more expedient to establish a legal
requirement for good-faith participation in mediation, enabling parties to police

228

Others have discussed this phenomenon, called “satellite litigation,” in relation to
good-faith requirements. See Lande, Good Faith Requirement, supra note 142, at 8–9 n.10.
229
See, e.g., Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Nev.
2011); Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1287 (Nev. 2011). It is important to
note that in these cases, the mediator, and not the other party, was required to report
failures to comply with mediation statutory requirements. See Levya, 255 P.3d at 1277;
Pasillas, 255 P.3d at 1284.
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each other on the front end of dispute processing, rather than for the government to
intervene downstream to determine whether parties took their duty to negotiate
seriously. Yet, the good-faith requirement inserts a wildcard into the parties
bargaining relationship. One party can threaten to file a bad faith claim against an
opposing party if that party refuses to agree to certain terms. Thus, good-faith
requirements can become a potential weapon to be exploited by the more ruthless
negotiating party against the other.230 And, as discussed above, empowering the
mediator to act as a check against party misbehavior not only tampers with the
mediator’s neutral role, but also undermines confidentiality.231
Thus, when constructing statutory mediation procedures, legislatures need to
be aware when they are creating new causes of action. Sometimes inserting causes
of action promotes decentralized regulation and effectuates high quality
negotiations. But, disputes with inherently mismatched parties may require more
direct state intervention than a formalized mediation procedure since it cannot be
assumed the parties will regulate each other in mediation.
3. Avoid Obstructing Access to Justice
Another important issue for legislators to understand is that formalizing the
mediation process can make mediation harder, not easier, to access. For example,
although requirements to exchange information and documentation can lead to
more informed and efficient negotiations, they can also serve as a disincentive to
people who have suffered a harm from seeking redress. A person with a complaint
against a nursing home in Florida must, by statute, first document the harm and
then obtain an attorney’s imprimatur that valid grounds exist for legal action before
she can proceed to mediation, a statutory prerequisite to filing a claim in court.232 It
is not difficult to imagine how potential plaintiffs lacking the time, financial
resources, and emotional energy to complete each of these steps may be
discouraged from stepping forward. As others have noted, “one person’s
discouraged plaintiff is another’s quashed nuisance lawsuit,”233 suggesting that
procedural roadblocks like mandatory mediation may prevent lawsuits that lack
legal merit from reaching court yet also discourage individuals with valid claims
from coming forward. When creating mediation procedure, legislatures must
consider whether one party will bear a heavier burden than the other to reach the
negotiation table.
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4. Decouple Mediation Process from Policy Outcomes
Policymakers must further recognize that a statutory mediation mandate does
not guarantee particular policy outcomes and that sometimes more interventionist
regulation will be necessary, particularly for business-consumer disputes about
which the public may have particular concern. Indeed, if policymakers attempt to
protect consumers by formalizing their negotiations with more powerful business
interests, as discussed above, then those powerful players may be unwilling to
negotiate. As David Luban notes, if the outcomes of mediated negotiations differ
significantly from the outcomes of unmediated negotiations, then powerful players
have little incentive to participate234 and consumer protection goals remain
unattained.
This prediction played out in Hawaii’s mandatory dispute resolution program
for nonjudicial, contractual foreclosures. In an effort to protect homeowners,
policymakers passed a law mandating foreclosure mediation as a way to interrupt
automated foreclosure practices that often resulted in mistakes or improper denials
of loan modification requests.235 The loan servicers found the statutory dispute
resolution process so overly legalistic and cumbersome that they chose to pursue
foreclosure through the courts, rather than participate.236 Some in the loan
servicing industry, particularly in those jurisdictions where mediation could not be
bypassed, complained that requiring negotiations with homeowners in foreclosure
mediation added costs, gave homeowners an opportunity to remain in their homes
longer without making mortgage payments, and wasted time by delaying the
inevitable. From the lender’s point of view, there was nothing to negotiate: a loan
was in default, the home was collateral on the loan, and the remedy under the law
was for the lender to foreclose and recoup the value of the loan.237
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Ultimately, decentralized governance alone was not enough to address the
lender and loan servicer behavior that contributed to the foreclosure crisis; a more
interventionist governance approach was also needed. Indeed, the federal
government created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2010 with
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, a
new federal agency tasked with supervising companies, restricting unfair or
abusive practices, and enforcing federal consumer financial protection laws.238 And
in 2012, the state attorneys general from forty-nine states,239 the District of
Columbia, and the U.S. Department of Justice together sued the largest loan
servicers for improper business practices leading up to, and during, the residential
mortgage foreclosure crisis.240 Thus, policymakers need to be aware that, while it
may appear more politically expedient to require parties to mediate and then shape
their behavior within the context of mediation, direct government intervention may
be required to achieve the intended policy outcome.
Finally, making decisions about policy reform requires access to information,
but the mediation process can obscure information with its confidentiality
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protections and individualized approach to dispute resolution. Therefore,
legislatures should spend time considering whether “nudging” more disputes to
resolve out of the public eye, erodes transparency and undermines the state’s
interest in protecting consumers. Will families be able to assess the safety practices
of an adult care home if previous complaints were resolved in confidential
mediation sessions? How can consumer advocates identify patterns of misconduct
by loan servicers or telecommunications carriers if individual claims are resolved
quietly, one at a time? Whether the state should relinquish its power over dispute
resolution outcomes, and whether parties, often unequally matched, can actually
regulate each other in settlement negotiations, are questions hotly debated by
scholars.241 Policymakers should be thoughtful about what kinds of disputes may
have significance to the public. Some existing proposals for preserving public
information while encouraging settlement include requiring parties to report the
outcome of settlements negotiated in mediation in a national database242 or for the
parties themselves to make mediated settlement terms publically available.243
As this discussion demonstrates, statutory mediation mandates are not neutral
because they create procedures that have substantive regulatory effects. Even
though parties must agree to any outcomes of mediation, the way in which the
process is structured influences parties’ negotiation leverage. Consequently, the
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design of, and infrastructure surrounding, the mediation process can bolster or
diminish the quality of mediated negotiations and their subsequent outcomes. It is
the work of governments to determine what to regulate and how to regulate, and
dispute resolution is no exception. Therefore, legislatures seeking to shift authority
for dispute resolution from the state to private parties have important decisions to
make about how to formalize dispute resolution procedures that advance public
values of efficiency, equity, and fairness.
VII. CONCLUSION
Mediation became a popular dispute resolution process in the United States
beginning with the judicial reform movement of the late 1970s. In the intervening
years, mediation has become “institutionalized” and an established component of
dispute resolution procedure in courts and administrative agencies. Today, with
greater frequency than ever before, legislatures deploy mediation as a means of
regulating how private parties resolve their disputes. These statutes exemplify
decentralized governance: disputing parties resolve their conflicts without state
adjudication yet within procedural parameters laid down by the state, shifting
responsibility for resolving disputes from the state to the parties themselves.
State legislatures deploy mediation in two primary ways. First, they make
mediation mandatory for parties seeking to assert or defend specific statutory
rights. Through these mandates, legislatures expand the state’s reach, catching
parties early in the conflict, sometimes before they have submitted their dispute to
a court or an administrative agency. Second, legislatures not only require
mediation, but also include additional legal requirements. In so doing, legislatures
directly or indirectly influence the resolution of the dispute by removing party
discretion, incentivizing settlement, or changing parties’ negotiation leverage.
Legislators, in an effort to make private parties responsible for dispute
resolution, need to be careful about which aspects of the mediation process they
formalize. They cannot always assume that, when it comes to redressing certain
kinds of harms, private disputants are adequately positioned—and capable—to
work together to resolve their disputes and reach fair outcomes. In some ways,
formalizing parts of the mediation process adds structure that can help parties
engage in more informed and efficient negotiations. Yet in other ways, these
statutory dispute resolution regimes add complexity to the dispute resolution
process and depend on the parties’ ability to police each other. This complexity can
burden parties and frustrate the state’s effort to make them more actively engaged
in resolving their disputes.
Ultimately, by enacting these mandatory mediation statutes, it appears
legislators have generated a paradox. These statutes anchor dispute resolution
within civil society, encouraging parties to negotiate directly and empowering
them to take responsibility for resolving conflicts without state intervention. Yet in
order to ensure fairness and balance disparate negotiating power or, perhaps more
cynically, to increase the likelihood that parties actually settle disputes without
using state resources, legislatures have transformed an informal process like
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mediation into a formal, regulatory tool. Legislatures should approach statutory
mediation mandates like any other form of regulation and take care to engineer
dispute resolution processes that promote, rather than impede, social welfare and
access to justice.

